A DISCOURSE ON OUR LATE PROCEEDINGS IN THE BALTIC

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B. B, R. A. S.

BOMBAY BRANCH
OF THE
ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY.
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DISCOURSE

ON

OUR LATE PROCEEDINGS

THE BALTIC.

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DISCOURSE

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OF OUR

LATE PROCEEDINGS IN THE BALTIC.

COMPRISING

A FEW CURSORY REMARKS

UPON

HIS MAJESTY'S DECLARATIONS,

OF

The 25th September, and 18th December, 1807.

THE SECOND EDITION.

BY THE AUTHOR OF CURSORY REMARKS, AND OF THE APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE ON THE NECESSITY OF RESTORING THE SPANISH TREASURE SHIPS.

Consilia callida et audacia, prima fronte læta; tractata dura; eventu tristia.
TERTULL.

London:
Printed by W. M'Dowall, Pemberton Row, Gough Square.
FOR MAXWELL AND WILSON, NO. 17, SKINNER STREET.
1808.
Price Five Shillings.

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THE PREFACE.

TO THE PUBLIC.

IN the month of October, 1804, when the late Mr. Pitt commenced the war with Spain, by the *irregular* capture of the Spanish treasure-ships, (it was then called IRREGULAR) I ventured to lift up my voice against an act—which I considered, abstractedly, as subversive of the law of nations, and tending to the formal abrogation and disavowal of that salutary code—in itself unjust, cruel, and piratical; but, connected with our own peculiar circumstances, interests, and relation in the general war, as weak as it was violent, and as impolitic as it was perfidious.

At that time, I appealed, (with what energy I was able) to the sense, the feelings, and the principles of the country. I called aloud for the restitution of that ill-gotten and worse-omened plunder, which has now become, for two-thirds the disposable property of the King, and for the other, his Majesty's gift to the public, in aid of his Chancellor of the Exchequer. I ventured to admonish; I summoned the nation to disavow the great crime that had been committed; "to sepa-"rate its name and its conscience from the "guilt of the government:" it was in vain—*Diis aliter visum est.* The depraving spirit of finance, and the ministerial-commercial convenience of the hour, (despicable dangerous convenience) overpowered and strangled the public sentiment; and the pure and honest character, (which was some time that of Englishmen) was oppressed and suffocated under barrels of Spanish coin, now

became DROITS of the Admiralty, as the lawyers call it; but, as statesmen know, the money of the crown, and the resources, the secret service-money of its Ministers.

I LIFTED my voice against that enormous act, with the success of which I only was worthy, and not, I trust, my country—for I failed—yet not failed; since I would not now exchange for the crown of Napoleon, (if he had inherited it) the secret solid satisfaction of the effort I then made.

UPON the "fat and placable altar of the British Diana,*" the Minister made the pious offering of one third part of the *net proceeds* of our piratical concern. The priests of the God of Finance accepted *their* million, and

* "Pinguis ubi et placabilis ara Dianæ."

the Crown reserved *its* Two Millions, of the now common plunder and common iniquity. The nation, the counties, the people, remained silent—but to be silent was to be accessary, and to be accessary was to be a principal, in the great Treason which had been committed against the common faith and loyalty, the fealty and law-paramount of civilized mankind. Three millions of Spanish treasure, stolen during the time of profound peace by ways of force and bloody fact of war, were divided in this way between the crown and the "supplies;" the generous Spaniard remains unredressed, and Mr. Pitt is buried with public honours and at the public expence—two millions of droits of the Admiralty, in the disposal of the crown, and at this hour, as it is more than to be feared, almost daily distributed under the *sign-manual*—could not prevent this burthen upon his country!

CAN we wonder then, that the garrisons of the Cape of Good Hope, and of St. Helena, have wandered upon a buccanering expedition to Buenos Ayres? and that Capt. Popham has been so preposterously *recompenced by the servants of the Crown, for the dreadful sentence of his court-martial?* or are we to be filled with astonishment at our terrible procedure at Copenhagen; as if with the impunity of one crime, and the reward of another, any excess or consummation of iniquity ought to be unexpected, or any perfidy or violence to surprise us?

MR. PITT is at his account, (and fair befal him) where with mortal eyes we cannot pursue him; his enemies—if he has enemies now—have left him to his friends and to posterity. It is for those who daily coin their own currency upon his corpse, to separate or connect our Spanish and our Danish ini-

quity—Captain Popham is the link between. The King has been advised formally and solemnly to discard and cancel the law of nations altogether*; the British nation, once so magnanimous and renowned, avows a competition of fraud and force with France: the question is fairly and publicly at issue, and that the fate, and the *just fate*, of Britain is involved in it, I should think there is no man to deny. Has the King been fairly, duly, timely, and perfectly informed? Has *all* the plan, with *all* its means and issues, been proposed and submitted to his Majesty *at once?* Was his Majesty made acquainted, and is he even now aware, that his commanders "could not be answerable for the "success of the attack, unless the INHABI-

* Vide the last paragraphs of the Declaration, 25th of September, in the Appendix.

" TANTS of *Copenhagen* were made to feel " the distresses to which besieged places " were subject?" Does the King know, that these are the words of Admiral Gambier in the mouth of the Captain of the fleet; that they were written by Sir H. Popham during the bombardment, to some of the commanding officers of his fleet*? Does the

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* Extract from a Dispatch from Sir H. Popham, to the Secretary of the Admiralty, dated—Diadem, Rio-de-la-Plata, August 25, 1806. This extract, among others, Sir Home Popham *complains*, was suppressed in the Gazette.

" This act,)" the re-capture of Buenos Ayres by the Spaniards) " increases the military character of General " Beresford, and the well-earned fame of his army, &c. " while the reflection of the FAITHLESS SPANIARD " must shortly satisfy him, that *his* advantage has been " obtained by a LOSS OF HONOUR, by an INFRACTION " *of every national pledge, and by a violation of every*

most humane and merciful of men, the best and most benignant of Sovereigns, *know* ALL THIS; or has his royal consent been obtained partially and progressively, upon partial views and representations, according, and commensurate, to the growing difficulties, or perfect

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" MORAL TIE, which the SOPHISTRY or EXAMPLE of
" the BISHOP or the Admiral can never justify!!!

(Signed,) H. POPHAM."

The above quotation is from the appendix to Sir H. Popham's trial, published by *authority*.

After the most diligent research and inquiry in the books, and from the officers of the Navy Board; and the confident assertion of several distinguished officers in the navy—I can venture to assure the British nation, that the writer of this dispatch is the identical Sir Home Popham, Captain of the Copenhagen fleet, and author of the celebrated recommendation *in favour of the inhabitants*, cited in the preceding page.

impossibility of receding, of repairing what *had* been done, and of retreating from what was *actually performing?*

HERE I confess I perceive the *first* hope for Britain and for the world. But if it fails—I think it will not fail—but *if* it fails, will the parliament of the United Kingdom avow, and adopt, and sanction, and incorporate, the desperate act and character of the policy defended and proclaimed in his Majesty's declaration*?

To me, I confess, it appears matter of grave and serious deliberation, whether by the laws and constitution of this country,

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* Vide particularly the last paragraphs of the Declaration of September 25th, in the Appendix.

the acting committee of the Privy Council, commonly called the CABINET, possess the power—whether it be intrusted with the discretion—whether, indeed, the PREROGATIVE *itself*, under the most *formal* and *regular* exertion of its authority, be competent to disclaim, repeal, and abrogate, at once, and upon any sudden occasion, the whole public law and usage of nations; and to announce to the world RESOLUTIONS like those I am considering with so much horror and disgust! This LAW OF NATIONS is received, adopted, and acknowledged by the common law, and by the statutes of the realm. It is, PART of the common law of England. Any offence against it, (I speak after our greatest lawyers*) has always been punishable by the

* Lords Mansfield, Talbot, Hardwick, Holt, &c.

common law; and it is particularly recognized and sanctioned by the memorable statute of Queen Anne, which was sent by her ambassador to the Emperor of Russia, as an atonement and peace-offering for its infraction

I SPEAK, I hope, with becoming deference and respect; but I do entertain considerable doubt upon the legality of this instrument, in which the King—not present in any of his councils, nor surrounded by any of his responsible advisers; without even the smallest attestation or signature of a single minister—is made to exercise (if it be his prero-

* The statute did not alter the common law, but reinforced it. The common law had not provided a sufficient punishment, which this act not only did, but did it without a trial by jury.—Blackstone, vol. i. 255, 256.

gative) the most important and comprehen sive act of his prerogative—

Tantamne rem tam negligenter?

This is the least that can be said of it; and that before the fatal resolution was taken to abjure restraint and right, and to contend with and "anticipate*," the ruler of France in his lawless career, by these terrible "coun- "teractions," it required, it was worthy of the gravest discussions, and of the MOST AUTHENTIC SOLEMN FORMS OF THE LAW- FUL AUTHORITY OF THE STATE.

BEFORE Ministers had learnt to thirst after "DROITS OF THE ADMIRALTY," and when wars were declared before some plunder

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* Declaration, 25th September,

could be surprised from an enemy, it required the King's presence in council to proclaim them, and even now, if I am not mistaken, a variety of proclamations of no vast import, such as bounties or pardons to seamen, &c. are invariably promulgated "by and with the advice of his Privy Council." It is by and with *this protecting* and *responsible* advice, (protecting to the Crown, responsible to the People) that his Majesty suspends even a corn-law; and yet without this, or any other sanction or attestation, is the whole public law of nations suspended and abrogated altogether!

I CONFESS I have so learned the constitution of our ancestors, that I know not where to find the King in the exercise of any one office of his Crown, unless in one or other of his councils, in that of his parliament, his judges, his privy council, &c. But now

comes a Master-act indeed of the Royal Prerogative:—abolishing the public law of nations; confounding and rescinding the nature and obligation of all the relation and intercourse of the State with the rest of the civilized world; announcing the new and unprincipled system of the "*counteraction* of *crimes by crimes;*" and proclaiming his Majesty's accession to the Jacobin code, and the glorious doctrine—that power makes right!—I say, out comes this lion-like proclamation, with the steps of a mouse—by whom advised, and by whom witnessed? by whom recommended, and by whom discussed and agreed to? The minister who it appears was immediately concerned, signs himself DOWNINGSTREET!

I HAVE not the honour of knowing the gentleman, nor can I find his name in the RED BOOK; it is however most probable,

he is a minister of state and a member of parliament. I would ask, therefore, of the Right Honourable Mr. Downingstreet, whether he is quite sure, that this act could be done lawfully *out of the Privy Council*; or that it did not require *even the legislative authority*, in as much as it professes to repeal, or suspend that which has for time immemorial, been adopted and recognized by the common law of England, and formally by the statutes of its legislature?

But if it be adjudged that this enormous and extravagnt Discretion be lodged by law in the prerogative, and that the Sovereign in his court of Privy Council, be legally entitled to dissolve and annul that law, which, *intra fines*, it is his undoubted right and office to interpret, and pronounce, and administer—I shall then, with

great submission, contend, that it is in his Majesty's *Court of Privy Council* ALONE, *that* this power can be legally exercised; and that it cannot be delegated, or devolve even to the acting committee of council, or cabinet, which is totally unknown to the constitution of these realms, and in which, according to the humble view I take of these high matters, I can only discover so many individual members of the council, tendering their advice to the Sovereign, under their own great personal responsibility; and, *à fortiori*, that it cannot be lawfully intrusted to the individual discretion of the Minister DOWNINGSTREET. It is for parliament to consider seriously of this important point, and to declare or define this extraordinary privilege or claim of the executive government. —In every sense it is for parliament to discern and decree, whether this prerogative

has been legally and wisely executed?—whether its advisers have used a sound discretion and a legal form?

But in the important and affecting case which *has* occurred—the plunder of the ships of Denmark, and the bombardment, in full time of peace, of the capital of his Majesty's best and oldest ally—a capital, by the intercourse and intermarriages of so many happy and peaceful centuries, and by the relations of such long amity and such extensive commerce, essentially almost *half* British.—In this affecting case, which *has* occurred *previous* to the promulgation of the new code of public law, (whether it were lawful or not to issue this declaration, and whether or not that can be law, which is an avowed rivalry and race with the King's enemies, in what ever is unlawfull), it is evident that there is a peculiar hardship and

cruelty upon Denmark, inasmuch as the declaration of his Majesty gives a general warning to every other power; whereas she alone, has received no notice or caution at our hands!!! Every other nation is apprized in time, of our new profession of faith; but with her, our blow anticipated our proclamation; and her fate has this peculiarly cruel and severe, that she is the first victim of our oppression, and the last of our perfidy —For, did not the framer of the declaration feel, that whatever success we may have in our violence, we can no longer surprise and deceive? America and Portugal (and if any thing else remains neutral in the world) have due notice. They have received their caveat, they know our new principles, and have seen his Majesty's royal commination.—The court of Lisbon has well profited of the Jacobin advertisement. The Prince Regent has not permitted his Majesty to an-

ticipate the crimes, or "the success of the crimes of France," in the Tagus. The unfortunate Danes alone had no warning, and this is what must for ever distinguish their case from that of any other power against whom his Majesty may have been advised, or is advised to direct any more of his "counter-actions."

THERE has been another exertion of the prerogative of the Crown, (and connected with our proceedings in the Baltic) the legality of which I am not disposed to call into question; but as to the propriety and wisdom of which, I entertain serious doubts, whether it be not now as urgent and imperative that its advisers should be, somehow or other, convinced that they are responsible to the country, (and to that which defends the country, and alone preserves and guards it as a country) the navy, and the naval ser-

vice. I mean the extraordinary circumstance of the promotion of Sir H. Popham, reeking from the "severe reprimand" of his court-martial, over the heads of more than one hundred and fifty of his senior officers, to the high rank and important office of *Captain of the Fleet*, (which invested him with the rank of Admiral), and placed him in a situation so painful to the feelings of some of the most distinguished and experienced officers of that service, and employed in that fleet, that it is only owing to their virtue and public spirit, (as well shewn in this forbearance, as in the proudest of those battles in which they have hardly earned their rank, their *honours*, and their *scars*) that they submitted. I can in this place, only speak in a very cursory manner indeed; but the unprincipled and plundering attack upon Buenos Ayres is too much connected, is too evidently the middle connecting link of our Jacobinism in 1804,

with our Jacobinism in 1807, for me to be able to pass it over altogether; and having had an opportunity of learning the manner in which the complaints and reclamations of these officers have been treated by the First Lord of the Admiralty; and that this minister has taken upon himself to suppress their *official* remonstrance upon the subject, to the Board of Admiralty, and to communicate with them *privately*, and not without an insulting insinuation, through the Admiral, of whose conduct, in the appointment of Captain Popham, they were complaining. I will find, or make an opportunity of calling the attention of parliament and the public to these important proceedings *,—the more so, as the whole of these officers have now, either by an addition of rank, or a change of station, no longer

* Vide authentic papers in the Appendix.

to complain of the indignity they suffered, being restored to their natural precedence and superiority over Captain Popham, and having no longer any personal reason to complain.—I say, the *more* so, for knowing the services, and the *character of the services*, of these great and gallant commanders, whose feelings and the expression of them, have been censured by the First Lord of the Admiralty, (who without his Board, is unknown, as I take it, to the naval service, to the constitution or the law of England), I cannot but know, that they would not have received their flags at all, or have accepted any other honours or stations, than they knew themselves to be entitled to, by many long years of honourable danger and exertion, much less as a compromise or compensation for the injury they particularly admitted against themselves, in consenting to serve at a critical time, under Captain Popham, and

least of all, as the price of subsequent silence and submission under this injury to them and the public service, which, is so far from being *redressed*, (except by cessation,) that their complaint has never yet been noticed by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, even if it has ever made its way through Admiral Gambier and Lord Mulgrave, to the table of that Board. Some allusion to these proceedings, I understand, has appeared from the pen of Sir H. Popham, to which, for some reason, or more probably, from some feeling or other, these distinguished officers have not thought proper to reply.

But they will forgive me, who from near observation, know how much more than meets the eye, and how much deeper than common penetration, their cause is the cause of their country—who think, at least,

I see every string and fibre of the corrupting principle which undermines and saps the State, and the vital life of the Empire—who deeply feel, and am convinced, that without the piracy of 1804, we could not have had the plundering of Buenos Ayres, or the bombardment of Copenhagen, and dread the rapid series and consummation of the public infamy and ruin. I say, they will forgive me, if I lose no occasion of giving publicity and authenticity to their case and their conduct.

TEN years, said Mirabeau, are scarcely a single political day; and it is only three years, (a few hours he would have called it,) from the seizure of the treasure ships to the conflagration of Copenhagen. "But time anticipates our dread exploits." Buenos Ayres has been the middle step, the half-way-house in our Jacobin journey; and it is this,

in my eyes, which gives the sole importance to Captain Popham, and the greatest danger to his promotion. Buenos Ayres has its friends, and Captain Popham his patrons; and these are the executive Ministers of the country, the confidential favourites of the Crown, the authors of our wrongs to Denmark, and the advisers of that proclamation, in which the King of Great Britain announces to the affrighted world, his resolution to "counteract" and "*anticipate*" the crimes of the French government.

THE great, the master question, which arises from these important and distressing acts, is as simple as it is sublime, and as clear as it is transcendant.—Is THIS THE VOICE OF BRITAIN?

WILL this country, renowned during three centuries at least, for good faith, sincerity,

and honour—which has grown to this proud and mighty bulk by honesty and fairness, and singleness of heart, (as other empires have extended themselves by violence and cunning, whose strength is justice, and whose power, opinion)—the esteem and terror of the world, its secret hope, its present consolation, the admiration even of its enemies—Will it abjure its cause and name, and its purity, and its protecting god, for this new rivalry and competition in iniquity and force?

I trust, I devoutly pray, it may start from its lethargy, its late and criminal indifference, to fame and honesty. I shew it THE WRITING ON THE WALL.

THE AUTHOR.

A

DISCOURSE,

&c. &c. &c.

THE promptitude with which the armament was assembled, and the energy and vigour displayed at the bombardment of Copenhagen, have been thought to reflect great honour upon his Majesty's servants; and had Denmark omitted, or admitted, or committed any thing which could subject its capital to that severe, and hardly military mode of attack; or had the forcible removal of the Danish fleet and stores been a measure either just or political, their claim would

scarcely have been challenged, and not, certainly, by me.

Every display of the power and prowess of Great Britain, every success and triumph of her arms, finds our hearts bribed and our senses secured: amid the firing of the Park and Tower guns, and an alarm of joy from the brazen throats of the hundred parishes of London, it is not to be expected of our reason and our passions to discuss the policy, or the justice, or the conduct of our arms.—It is their victory, and nothing else, that we can be expected to feel or to celebrate. Were it otherwise, the constitution could not have placed, with safety, the power of these demonstrations with the Ministers of the Crown. If we were pledged never to be wise, or to do justice hereafter, because we had once rejoiced in the triumph or escape of our fellow soldiers, or our fellow countrymen, Captain Popham could never have been tried for his exploit at Buenos Ayres; and it would have been better, indeed, that

he should not, if we may not now question his subsequent promotion. It had been far preferable for the subordination of the navy, and its chance of future freedom from political faction, and speculation, and intrigue, that this gentleman should have pleaded the marrow-bones and cleavers of Sheffield and Birmingham, as a full pardon, and in bar of his trial; than that he should have been so severely censured by his court-martial, and so preposterously rewarded by the servants of the Crown. Not that I am disposed to deny the qualifications of any leader or planner (whomsoever) in the notable expedition to the Plate-River, for a full share in the more memorable achievements in the Baltic; I am inclined, however, thus early in the present inquiry, to impress, as much as I am able, upon the mind of my reader, that he is not pledged in any of the three connected cases of our Jacobinism, because he may have momentarily rejoiced in our success. The Spanish and Danish plunder, I fear not, will one day be restored;

and in the whole empire there are not twenty individuals either interested, or pledged to resist the restitution. And this I say in *the broad and general hope* of a returning public principle and character in England; for as to the immediate object of the present Discourse, there is very particular ground and room for English pride and feeling—for consolation, for hope, and even for exultation. I allude to the manner in which the *triumph* of the King's ministers was received by his good cities of London and Westminster;—for, in spite of cruel *necessity* and pious *reluctance*, and the *hard paramount duty** imposed upon them, it had somehow become a triumph; not, doubtless, because it had been procured with the blood of so many brave and loyal subjects of the King's ally, his friend, and brother-in-law, and the conflagration of a peaceful capital—It had however become a triumph, and his Majes-

* Declaration, Sept. 25th.

ty's garrisons received orders to announce it as a triumph. What answered this good and great metropolis? just, generous interpreter, and, I hope, eternal example of public sentiment and virtue! Not a farthing candle, not a boy's bonfire, not a garret window, not a butcher with his adz and bone, not a drunken fiddler, not a squib, a cry, a song, or a shout, profaned or belied the sterling sense, the grave imperturbable honesty, the genuine feeling and character of the people. The ministers piped, and they would not dance; they would not hear "the voice of the charmer, although he charmed so wisely;" they answered only with sullen indignation to those peals and vollies with which the authors of the expedition were converting into a triumph that CRUEL, HARD, PAINFUL, IRRESISTIBLE NECESSITY, with which they had hitherto seduced and lulled the conscience of the country! Oh, memorable day, worthy to survive in history what remains to be achieved of our decline and disgrace, and extinction! Oh day! so truly free and British,

and perhaps so near the last day of freedom and of Britain!

OUR expedition, announced so long as the result of *inevitable necessity*, for which the public mind was prepared and moulded, by the pious reluctance of the government—by its hope and secret understanding of the good wishes and "connivance" of the ENEMY, (our nearest allies and connections)—Our expedition, a great part of the force of which was so cunningly intended to gull and dupe those poor dolts and gulls, Napoleon and Talleyrand, and to throw an impervious veil over the expected treason of the Prince of Denmark, who was "to want the *means** *and the disposition*†" to defend his fleets and stores AGAINST US; who was to connive at their forcible theft and removal BY US—Our expedition found its success at last only by the bombardment, conflagration, and un-

* Declaration, Sept. 25, parag. 6. † Parag. 12.

distinguishing slaughter of our allies; and the King's servants, who pretended to lament so piously and so piteously the robbery they were reluctantly committing, while they expected the willing surrender of their prize, no sooner found it was achieved only at the expence of fresh crimes, that it had reduced the capital of our ally to ashes, and filled its streets with the blood of his unarmed subjects, than they proclaimed their deed as a matter of joy, triumph, and exultation!!!

I HAVE called bombardment a mode of war hardly military, for I do not consider it (except in very particular cases) as amongst the lawful means of military hostility.—It is civil compulsion and distress, effected by indiscriminate severity and military execution.—It is not battle, it is not siege; it is neither approach nor conflict; it neither saps, nor mines; nor has it even the honour of *starving*, to surrender. It is directed neither against fortification, citadel, nor garrison.—Officers and soldiers are often, I think, al-

ways, less exposed to its danger, than miserable innocent women, children, citizens, labourers, and all the unoffending helpless human flock, we spare in honourable warfare.—It is the torture applied to the soldier's heart, by the suffering of the unarmed and helpless; it is the screw and lever of political inhumanity, operating upon the compassion and generosity of a soldier, and extorting, with the question and the wheel, that submission which you cannot obtain by the sword and the bayonet. Let it not be supposed, that, at the hour the Danish Governor signed the capitulation, *one military step* had been taken to compel it, or that the smallest approach had been made to the town or the arsenal. The *capture*, the military surrender of the capital of our ally, was at as great a distance *then*, as at the moment of our disembarkation. But we had placed our infernal machine in the bosom of the governor, and tormenting him with the blood and tears of his citizens, we extorted from the man, what the soldier could have defended

for ever. " It was the INHABITANTS who " were to be made to feel the distress and " calamity of this warfare:" It was against *them* that our horrid missiles were directed, over the heads of the military and the bastions; nothing was safe, in Copenhagen, *from the British* arms, *but* the fortifications and the soldiers. In God's name, what port of France, or of Morocco, if you were at war with it, could you have treated more barbarously than these loyal and worthy Danes, your friends and allies, half English, by the frequent intermarriages of peaceful centuries, long intercourse, and commercial connection; whose perfect innocence you professed to admit, and whose revenge your commanders were deprecating, by pretended remorse, and the vile plea of reluctance and necessity*. By this accursed cruelty, however, we obtained our end, and we wrung

* Vide the Proclamations and Summonses of the Admiral and General, in the Appendix.

the hulls and hemp and rotten timber of Copenhagen*, from the human feeling and the heart's core of General Peyman, the Governor.

WHAT next? Why, our success in such a cause, and by such means, our pious Admiral does not scruple to ascribe to the favour of Divine Providence, and our "reluctant" ministers to announce with the royal cannon, as matter of congratulation and rejoicing!!! Thank God, the nation thought otherwise, and their opinion seems to have put a timely stop to the headlong course of those honours, by which it once seemed to have been intended, to place the success of Mr. Gambier, upon a footing with the most glorious exploits of the Howes, the St. Vincents, the Nelsons, and the Duncans. How

* The whole amount of these articles plundered at Copenhagen, is not equal to three weeks consumption of the royal navy.

the coronet mixes with the laurels of Admiral Gambier, how the peerage becomes him, as the bright reward of his pure and virtuous success, I shall not inquire; I do not even know, if he be summoned to parliament by the style and title of Baron Copenhagen, or Baron Blefuscu, as the noble Admirals, whose names I have cited, took their titles from their lofty deeds, and from the scenes of their noble achievements.—It *is something*, that the lavish hand of promotion has known *where* to stop; that it has ventured to strike and distribute no medals, and that the breast of no British officer is to be profaned by wearing, as a badge of honour, and a commemoration of happiness, a device, an image, or a remembrance, of the bombardment and plunder of the peaceful Copenhagen *.

* It is difficult to understand, however, by what avarice of honour, the *sole* reward of this exploit, is reserved for the Commanders in Chief. There is surely no want of

THERE is, however, no little reason to fear that, from this circumstance and this date, arose all the vile calumnies which were now, for the first time, invented against the Prince of Denmark and the Danes. Had the country rejoiced with the ministers in these nameless deeds, there had been no reason to propagate the base lies and slanders, with which it has been attempted to inflame the passions of the populace against this innocent unoffending power; at whose injuries and unmerited sufferings, the most distant corners of the earth have kindled with common sentiments and united rage.—Gracious God! What a nation is ours!—to have become in a few little weeks, the scorn, the hatred, the outcast, and the bye-word of the world. Are our ears as yet accustomed to the style and title, and hon-

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disposition to promote Sir H. Popham; and, if the Admiral deserved a peerage, the Captain of the Fleet has some claim to a minor distinction, &c.

ourable distinctions, awarded us by the common indignation of the world? are we yet used and callous to the sounds? Do we endure to be called "the robbers," "the thieves," "the perfidious English," "the pirates," "the burners of peaceful cities," and "the plunderers of confiding friends?" or—

"Does it run like iron through our soul?"

I HAVE hitherto confined myself to the shewing of the body of our public crime; and I have no little doubt, whether I ought *in this place*, to speak of all those vile artifices of falsehood and detraction, which, at the epocha I have pointed out, designated the Danish government as having secretly prepared and accumulated immense and incredible quantities of naval stores and ammunition, in the arsenals of Copenhagen, in understanding with the French Emperor, and for the purpose of assisting him in his schemes and projects for the invasion of this country and of Ireland. The falsehood is

now proved, in our disappointment of plunder and "droits;" but it is incredible, that Mr. Garlicke should have given this information; he must have known the contrary, and he is a man of worth, honour, and ability.* I say, I am in doubt, whether it is *here* that I should remind the public of the slanders, and half-official charges (since unhappily OFFICIAL,) preferred against his Majesty's nephew, the Prince Royal of Denmark, as wanting the "disposition" to defend his country.—Whether it be the place and time to point out to the sincere and honourable feeling of Englishmen, the grovelling, but atrocious guilt, of accusing the noble Danish nation of having only feigned to yield and submit to our fierce and excruciating process; of having only ceded their fleet to its reluc-

* I cannot believe he furnished them with any document of this nature; but his honour is concerned, that they should exculpate him. Perhaps they found it amongst the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit!!!

tant, weeping, pious conquerors, in order, by false bottoms and perfidious planks, to plunge us, on our return, to the bottom of the Baltic; as if the Danes did not despise our crimes too much to imitate them, and did not, in spite of Admiral Gambier and his piety, believe they may safely trust us to the vengeance of the Almighty, without striving to *imitate or anticipate* our perfidy and violence. Their government has published and proclaimed no new profession of political faith. It has not divorced and repudiated the public law of Europe, and their nation has engaged in no declared competition with its unprincipled and Jacobin enemies.

To return then, I have presented the *corpus delicti*, to the grand jury of the country. The crime is proved, and the bill is found—for we have not only *confitentes reos*; our accused do not only confess, but boast; and we therefore try not them only, but their plea and their principle. Let us then hear and consider their defence, their expurgation.

They have delivered it to an exasperated world in the sacred name of their Sovereign. They have enrolled it in our national archives. They have transmitted it to every power in Europe yet neutral enough, (if there are any) or sufficiently cold and dispassionate to receive it, or sufficiently sanguine to entertain a hope for our possible exculpation.

It is terrible to look only at its effect on Portugal, the most faithful and honourable of allies—there you behold your frigates and sloops fired at with heated shot, your Ambassador embarked, and your Admiral blockading the ships he wished to compel to come out. Do you doubt who interdicted to you the pass of Belem, and the entrance of the Tagus? Who excluded you from Lisbon, and left the hostile Russian fleet in safety and possession? It was the Prince Royal of Denmark—the wrongs of the Danes, and the justification of the King of Great Britain!!! Let us examine it, and we shall not wonder, (although the Prince of

Brazil had, in that very moment, given you back your factory, your merchants, your ships, your cargoes, and your compters, the price of his European crown and succession!!!—Though he had laid you under every possible obligation, and taken from you every moral bond, by his own sacrifices) —That he would not *trust* you—That he dared not to admit a ship of your's, nor a regiment, (of which you had not one in the Tagus) amongst fifty mad expeditions tossing on every sea, amid the winter storms —That he would not even trust your Ambassador with his intention *in your favour*, and *with his accession to your advice*; and dreaded as much, to the last hour of his escape, the British perfidy, as the revenge and tyranny of France. These are the first fruits of the blessings Admiral Gambier ascribes to Divine Providence at Copenhagen. May they be the last of this opprobrious tree, whose poisoned sap and blood-watered roots, can produce nothing but shame and death. Shameful perdition!

And now to the Declaration*, of which, before I speak in the terms which are demanded and extorted from me, by the disgrace and danger which have been brought upon the country; I think it not necessary, but still decent and respectful to premise, that I consider it, according to the maxims and practice of our constitution, as the production of his Majesty's Ministers, for which they are alone responsible, and I hope amenable to opinion and to law. This paper is the justification of *their* counsels and *their* acts; and so far am I from apprehending, that I do not even think it possible, that a single expression of mine can be tortured into offence even accidental, in that quarter where no man more than myself, breathes grateful

* Declaration of September 25. The other Royal Declaration of the 18th of December, in answer to that of the Court of Russia, seems intended, but with little dexterity, to repeal, or supersede this. It is only the more necessary to examine them apart and successively.

and loyal thoughts and remembrances; for I believe and trust, that it will shortly appear, that the royal sentiments have not been exactly those of this extraordinary paper; but that some *misapprehension* has existed between the King and his ministers; upon the clearing up of which in the present session of Parliament, I found the first hope of retrieving the innocence and blanching the honour of the country.

But if, contrary to wishes and expectation, so just, so loyal, and so natural, whether they are drawn from the flagrant character of the proceeding, or the internal evidence of the justification, or the long and happy experience we possess of the just and benignant disposition of our Sovereign, this hope should fail; if it should appear that the bombardment of Copenhagen was a part of the plan *originally* submitted to his Majesty; if the resolution proclaimed in his royal name, "henceforward to imitate and anticipate the violence and oppression of

France;" shall not be disavowed and repealed in that quarter, where it is most and first to be desired; it will be but the more necessary and imperative to comment with sincerity and freedom upon this paper, and every thing connected with it, in order that Parliament and the public voice, may pronounce what remains to be done in the dreadful predicament into which we are plunged! It is for parliament and for the country, to make known by every legal expression of their voice, the deep sense and feeling of a once noble people, and of a still great empire, at beholding itself thus suddenly immerged and abyssed in crimes, and the public law of nations formally renounced from the Throne—for in what light can the concluding paragraphs of his Majesty's Declaration* be regarded, but as a solemn deliberate official abjuration, in the temple of Jacobinism, of the cause and character of

* Vide Appendix.

Great Britain, and of the protection and guidance of Heaven. For my own part, if the country is to be saved in this terrible dilemma, I have no hesitation to declare, that our proceedings must be disavowed, our declaration recalled, our plunder restored, our crime expiated, and our enemies, whom our crime only has made so, satisfied. Am I understood; do I speak plain enough?

Puniendos esse censeo rerum atrocium *ministros.*

I trust the Crown will be humbly addressed by both Houses of Parliament, to disclose the persons who have advised the demand of the Danish fleet, the bombardment of Copenhagen, and the terrible principles, the rash or false assertions, and the inconsistent and irreconcilable pleas and assignments of this Declaration.

It must strike the attention of the most unobservant, that the Royal Declaration of the 25th of September, stands in great need to be reconciled with the summonses sent in

by his Majesty's commanders by sea and land to the Governor of Copenhagen*, and that of many circumstances of vast importance, (such as the "indisposition and the want of means" of the Prince Royal of Denmark, to defend the ships and capital against France, of which the King and his Ministers had the most positive information) our General and Admiral were utterly uninformed. If the most positive information of Ministers were subsequent to the instructions given to those officers, it could not justify their instructions: if it could justify their instructions, *i. e.* if it were previous to them, in God's name, why did they conceal them from Lord Cathcart and the Admiral? But whoever looks to the second paragraph of the King's Declaration, in which it is asserted, that "his Majesty *has delayed* this expedition, only in the hope of an amicable arrangement with the Court of Denmark,"

* Vide Appendix.

must perceive that the authors of the Declaration pretend to have had this most positive information for some considerable time, during which, his Majesty's moderation and forbearance would not permit him to act upon it. His Majesty, in the same paragraph, proceeds to say, that for this "amicable arrangement, he was ready to make "great efforts and sacrifices," and "that he "never lost sight of it, even in the most decisive hostility." It is extraordinary then, that his Majesty's commanders were left ignorant of his grievances, and of his intentions; and that the *delay* of the expedition, did not enable the leaders of it to be acquainted with the justice of their cause of quarrel, and the King's placability; but that all they knew, to the last moment, of the possibility of an amicable arrangement, with a power with which we were at peace, and in the closest connection, was, that the King's commanders were to bring away the Danish fleet, &c. by consent, if they could, and if not, by *bombardment;* during the whole of which operation,

they were to protest their reluctance to attest their humanity, and at the close of it, to attribute their success to Divine Providence!!!

THIS is certain y extraordinary; but when we recollect that the *bombardment* did not commence till the second of September; that the attack too had been delayed by the *humane* motives of ministers trying the effect of negociation, and moderation, and *forbearance;* it is impossible, utterly impossible, to suppose our commanders were uninformed of any cause of complaint against Denmark, which was *then* known to the British Cabinet; neither is it easy to reconcile the boasted vigour and energy of our preparations, with the pretended *delay* and moderation of our councils—if there were any delay, any deliberation, any discussion, any reflection at all!!! for the capitulation took place in exact conformity to the terms of the summonses of the Generals, and is utterly inconsistent and incompatible with the after-thoughts and after-charges of the Declaration.—And yet the

time consumed and lost in this forbearing delay was so precious, that his Majesty is advised to conclude the sentence already cited, (third parag.) with alledging, " that " his justification, (for the bombardment, " &c.) in the eyes of all Europe and of the " world, will be found in the commanding " and indispensable duty, paramount to all " others, amongst the obligations of a Sove- " reign, of providing, WHILE THERE WAS " YET TIME, for the IMMEDIATE security " of his people."

HIS Majesty must have run, therefore, a great and imminent risk from this *delay*, and his people have had a nice escape from an *immediate* danger!!!

THE next paragraph, (the 4th) explains the extent and nature of the perils to which we were so critically exposed, and from which we have been so singularly delivered. It expresses, that the King " had received " the most positive information of the deter-

" mination of the present ruler of France to
" occupy Holstein with a military force, for
" the purpose of excluding this country from
" her accustomed channels of communica-
" tion with the Continent—of *inducing* or
" *compelling* the court of Denmark to close
" the passage of the Sound, &c.—and
" of availing himself of the aid of the Danish
" marine, for the invasion of Great Britain
" and of Ireland."

WE have now, (owing to Divine Providence and Admiral Gambier) the whole aid of this Danish marine, in the ports of England; some of it has been condemned for fire-wood, and some of it has been surveyed, and reported unserviceable and unseaworthy; but I will shew you the extent of the imminent peril from which Admiral Gambier and Divine Providence have delivered us.

THERE are only three ships of the line fit for sea, and these are fit only for press ships, hulks, or prison ships. They are all

fastened with iron, and if they are worthy to be repaired for our service, they must be fastened with copper bolts; and it is apprehended, that their beams will not support them, and the weight placed upon the decks in our service will force these beams downwards, crushing the whole interior of the ship into the holds. The best of these three, *the Crown Prince*, has been surveyed, and I have no hesitation in stating, that she is declared by the officers of the King's yards, to be worth for sale not more than eight pounds per ton; and it is a melancholy truth, that we pay four times that sum for the construction of our own, or thirty-two pounds per ton—That is the contract price with the Navy Board. These three ships, then, which were our most imminent and *immediate* danger, are not equal to more than three-fourths of one of our own; and if Bonaparte had attempted to invade England or Ireland with them, the imminent and immediate danger had been his, and not ours.

As to the rest of the ships, if, for a motive I am about to assign, they are repaired at all, they will be liable to the same objections, (but more forcible) and the whole strength of three of the royal yards during six months (every other work being suspended) will be hardly equal to veneer and vamp them up for the *effect* proposed.

AYE, but the timber and the stores! why if our apprehension was from these, and their enormous bulk and magnitude, it is extraordinary that so much of the former should have been already sold, as useless, at Woolwich: it is true, a stop has been put to the sale, because it may be wanted for shew—Danish prize, Danish plunder, sounds well in certain ears; but of Holstein timber, the Navy Board have accurate, and some of them ocular knowledge.—I myself know something of it, and more belonging to it; quite enough, however, to say, that the Admiralty which shall embark British seamen

upon these spungy boards, must be held practically answerable for the consequences. If I am not deceived, and I have taken some pains not to be so, the whole of the stores and timber (perhaps excepting some of the spars for masts, and some canvass, for of the knees, which are the principal timber, not one in twenty are serviceable) would not pay the freight of bringing them home from Copenhagen; I mean the freight of those ships that were freighted at all; for a display was to be made, and perhaps the shipping interest to be satisfied by freight, for the dreadful depreciation which was to take place in the value of their materials, from the glut and inundation of Danish stores into the King's yards. Nine ships actually have been hired at an expence of more than ten thousand pounds to the public, to bring home this inexhaustible treasure, not one of which could find a stick or a relique of our holy deed, to bring away in commemoration of their pilgrimage. Brigs of war have been required in our ports, so late as the middle

of last December, and this in preference, and to supersede all other work; and when English ones have been reported ready, or nearly ready for service, they have been refused, because we wanted Danish ones to make a figure with, and to shew that we had obtained *something*, however miserable, in exchange for our honesty, our honour, and our character.

BEHOLD then, the extent of our immediate danger, and compare the value the proceeds of our crime, with the expence of it, with the pay of the expedition, of freight, with the forfeiture of good faith, of the esteem and favour of the world, of the justice, and sanctity of our cause, and of the protection of the Almighty.

COMPARE these proceeds too, with the charges falsely alleged against the Danish Court, of accumulating stores for the future (I beg pardon, the immediate use of France.) The danger of invasion, *both* to " England

and Ireland, was *immediate*"—So says the Royal Declaration. Where were they, that even Captain Popham could not find them out? No one disputes his talents that way; but where were they? You see they were not in the royal yards; and indeed if they had been, your Ambassador would have known of it. In private stores then—it was the speculation of *individual* merchants corrupted by France! In God's name then, why have you left them behind you? Why did you spare and except *in your capitulation*, the real object of your abominable bombardment?—You have taken nothing from the merchants who were in the interest of France. You have robbed only the government which you expected to *connive with you*.—You have stolen the property of your friends, and left untouched that of your enemies. You did not even include in your conditions, the merchant ships, already converted nt o gun-boats, transport ships, &c. &c. Your pious Admiral too, with the especial favour of Divine Providence, has

taken every thing he should have left behind him, and left behind him every thing he should have taken. If there is any truth in the Declaration, your General has as much to answer for, unless indeed, the summonses and the capitulation are admitted to have been made in perfect ignorance of all that was so well known to the Ministers who employed and instructed them. For why, if the allegations of that paper be correct and true—if the Prince Royal wanted the "disposition" to defend his country against France—has every thing been left precisely, besides these worthless ships and stores, to that disposition and to France? Why, if this were the disposition of the Court of Denmark, did you leave the Crown battery and the rest? Why the army and the arms? Why the seamen and the shipwrights? Our ministers ought to have known, that we wanted nothing so little as ships; and Bonaparte, nothing so much as sailors and artificers. They ought to have known, that they made a bad choice, even if it were an

innocent one, in giving to France the seamen and the shipbuilders, and the hearts of the Danes, and taking for themselves the fuel and the hulks. But what indication, what suspicion had they of this favourable disposition towards France, in a Prince, from whom the Declaration of the King*, expressly states, that his Majesty expected an unresisting surrender! a *connivance* for which he had generously provided a mask and colour against the penetration of France?—What symptoms did our commanders perceive of this disposition? Were all the forces and militia of Denmark assembled in Zealand to prevent *our* landing? No, they were in Holstein, preparing to make the neutrality of that province respected by the French, if it were in the contemplation of France to violate it. But they were putting their ships in commission, and pressing seamen? So far from it, that out of three ships of the

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* See the twelfth paragraph.

line, which formed their usual establishment, they had dismantled and dismissed the crews of two, in order to be better able to defend Holstein against the French, than they could have been with this diversion of their means and resources. In point of fact, the Prince of Denmark, even after an unsuccessful attempt to defend Holstein, had the means of returning into Zealand, and defending that island with the capital and ships against any force the French could bring against him; which leads me to that paragraph of the King's Declaration*, in which it is so hazardously and so ignorantly laid down, that "Holstein once occupied, the island of Zealand "was at the mercy of the French, and the "navy of Denmark at her disposal." Every military, every naval man, and every merchant, knows the rashness and indiscretion: I say no more (for I, too, have my fits of moderation and forbearance) of *this* assertion.

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* Vide the eighth paragraph.

For even upon the supposition of one of those extraordinary severe winters taking place, during which the Belt is frozen, and which upon a very long average, do not take place oftener than once in fifteen or sixteen years, (no very *immediate* danger) it is not true, that the island of Zealand lay at the mercy of France, and the Danish fleet at her disposal: and it is fortunate in more senses than one, that it is so; since, if this assertion of the King's Declaration were correct, it would be impossible to separate from the very basest, the bitterest, the most cruel, and most cowardly of insults, the offer of his Majesty to GUARANTEE* this very Holstein to Denmark.

IN God's name, what would the Danes have answered, (if it had not been for your bombardment?) would they not have said, "How can you guarantee to us that pro-

* See the 13th paragraph of the Declaration.

vince of ours, the possession of which by France, you tell us, places our capital and our navy at its mercy and its disposal? How can you guarantee any thing upon the Continent; or if you can, why did you not guarantee HANOVER to yourselves? But why do you, who tell us that your dominions were exposed to so "imminent and certain a danger," (if our wretched marine were at the disposal of France) as to justify your enormous breach of faith, your accursed bombardment of our city, and your formal rejection of the common law of all nations? Why do you presume, why do you dare, to mock us with the offer of any guaranty whatsoever? Is it for you, who tremble for your own islands, for Great Britain, and for Ireland, (if these miserable hulks are by any means added to the means of France) to promise protection to any one, and to offer guaranties for any part of the Continent? Is it for a nation, who does not blush to proclaim her infatuated cowardice, in the face of all the world, and to plead that

cowardice as the sole excuse of her crimes, to proffer security to others, and to invite them under her *ægis?* I should wish to know, what answer, what declaration, what counter-manifesto, we could shew to this, the plain, natural argument of Denmark? I wish to know, how it is possible for Ministers to vindicate themselves; and upon which of the five contradictory and irreconcileable pleas of their justification, they will rest their defence? The Prince of Denmark, who in one part of the Declaration, was expected to "connive" with us, is represented in another, as wanting inclination to defend Zealand and the ships against France; and these are asserted to be at the mercy of France, if Holstein were to be for a moment in her possession; and we, who have been unable to maintain our own Hanover, offer to secure, or guarantee to the Prince, his possession of Holstein!!! —Is not this adding insult to calumny, and both to violence and oppression? For observe, that it is not a convention, a compact,

or a treaty, that we demand of Denmark, but her ships—those very ships with which she was to defend the capital against the French, if they succeeded in driving the Prince Royal out of Holstein. No pledge, no assurance, will satisfy us that Denmark will defend herself, unless we put her defence out of her power, by the removal of her ships!!!

When I look at the rash and hazardous assertions which the Ministers have put into the sacred mouth of their Master, I can be little surprized at their total ignorance both of the disposition and the means of Denmark. How it came that their ambassador did not undeceive them as to the state of the royal Danish marine and stores, I can hardly account for; but that they should not know, that the arm of the sea which separates Zealand from Holstein is not congealed more than once in fifteen or sixteen years upon an average; and that the ice which then blocks up this channel, does

not offer a looking-glass for the sliding of artillery and battalions, but is full of ridges and drifts, and frozen rocks and hills, impassable, impracticable, and *from which no French army could mourn at any of their successes**—I say, that they should be ignorant of this, unfortunately, can astonish no one. This, however, was *their certain and imminent danger.* These were the authentic perils of our unwarlike shores, which were to be conquered at once, forsooth, with three rotten Danish ships of the line, if, by the strange chance of one in sixteen, for any ice at all, and the incredible, or impossible march of Bonaparte over its mountains, they had fallen into his hands!!! This too was the sum total and gross amount, of their "cruel and lamented *necessity* †," to seize

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* Vide Official Letter of Admiral Sir Sidney Smith, from the Tagus.

† See the third paragraph.

these miserable hulls, by the "aid of which "the King had the *most* POSITIVE *information, that it was the determination of the* "present Ruler of France, to attempt the "invasion of Great Britain and of Ireland *." To seize these three ships, which in spite of our guarantee of Holstein, were still in certain and imminent danger of being taken by Bonaparte, was "the commanding and "indispensable duty, paramount to all "others, amongst the obligations of a "sovereign, of providing, *while there was* "*yet time*, for the *immediate* security of his "people!!!"

THIS is the service (the capture of these three ships) "indispensable to the safety of "his Majesty's dominions. These are the "measures of *self-preservation*, to which "he has found himself compelled to resort,

* See the fourth paragraph.

" with so much pain and regret, which the
" state and circumstances of the world have
" required and justified, but for which he is
" by no means responsible !!!"

No, thank God, the constitution has taken care of that, his Ministers are responsible, and not that sacred head. It is his evil counsellors and advisers that must now find they are responsible indeed! It is these servants who have put one word into the Royal mouth, and another into that of his Generals and Admirals; those servants, who having plunged their Royal Master and their country in the most cruel, dangerous, and infamous predicament, do not now hesitate, for their own justification, to resort in their Master's name, to five distinct pleas and assignments, of which there is not one, which does not expose the falsehood or the fallacy of the four besides.

I SAY, the responsibility is not with the

King; and I say it the more readily, because it is the ONLY *assertion* in the whole Declaration to which any wise and virtuous man can give an implicit assent; the rest is sinister and tortuous; totally untrue, or if any where partially true, only true in the wrong place, and for the production of false inferences and erroneous, and conclusions. Were it cloathed with any other authority and name than that which it wears, (though not invested with its character) one could not scruple to say, that the truth was made to lie, in their mouth, so misplaced, so dislocated, so disjointed, so opposed, so confronted, are all its several abstract and component particles—so hostile is paragraph (which ever you please) with paragraph before, and paragraph behind; and all three with all the paragraphs that precede and follow them. For how are "the pain and regret, and the lamentable necessity," under which our expedition sailed, (and which after the success of our humane bombardment,

and the *triumph* of our virtuous ministers, the King still professes to feel in his Declaration) to be reconciled with the cause of his Majesty's just quarrel and lawful hostility, if *it be true*, that he had "*positive* information of the determination of the "French Emperor to employ the Danish "marine in the invasion of Great Britain "and of Ireland," and of the *disposition* of the Danish Court to connive with them, *instead of ourselves.*

I NOW leave out the real state of the marine and stores of Denmark, which are actually undergoing the ceremony of valuation in his Majesty's dock-yards, by the agent, the secretary, and the *infant* nephew of LORD Gambier, and son of Commissioner Gambier, upon the one part; and the officers of those yards, on the other; who are dependent for their promotion, and the ease of their situations, (if not for their situations) upon the Navy Board and the Admiralty, of which respectively Lord Gambier, and the father of

the infant prize agent, are Commissioners*. I shall find a time to speak of these——

Sed motos præstat componere ventos.

How are this pretended reluctant necessity, and these cruel adamantine "circumstances of the world," which leave nothing just, but rivalry in injustice, to be reconciled with the just cause the King possessed of expostulating with Denmark as a friend, and of eventually treating her as the worst and most criminal of his enemies!---if his Majesty was "confident of the authenticity" of his most positive information †?

How is the offer to "guarantee Holstein and all the European dominions of Denmark" against the French, to be reconciled with our own professed panic for both England and

* Not a Clerk of either of these Boards is allowed by law to be a prize agent.

† See the fifth paragraph.

Ireland from the three rotten ships, at eight pounds per ton, which formed three times the establishment of the whole royal Danish navy in commission? or with our abandonment of Hanover, the neighbour province of Holstein, and the patrimony of the family of our own King?

How is the expectation of connivance with England to be reconciled with the charge of indisposition* to defend Denmark against France?

How are the "urgency†, imminency, and certainty" of the immediate danger of, and from the invasion of *both his Majesty's Imperial Isles*, by the three ships of Denmark, to be reconciled with the "delay" pretended in the second paragraph of the Declaration? and how any "delay" at all with "the most po-

* See the sixth paragraph.

† See the third paragraph.

"sitive information, and the King's con-
" fidence in the authenticity* of the sour-
" ces from whence this intelligence was de-
" rived?"

How are any of these discordant pleas to be reconciled with the broad and general anathema with which the bull concludes, the doctrines of " counteraction" and " anticipation" which it pronounces, and the Jacobin dispensation of all restraint and justice? His Majesty's Ministers say, " *it is time*" to proclaim and act by this new table; as if they meant to blame the inertness of their predecessors, whom they will never forgive for having been so! They speak at least, of this fullness of time, as if their own conscience reproached them with inactivity and delay in putting their code in execution. They shew a kind of regret, that " the firstlings of their heart have not been the very firstlings of their hands;" and to feel something

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* See the fifth paragraph.

like remorse for the time they have suffered to elapse before they placed their country in its present proud, innocent, and happy predicament!! It is evident, however, that their present resolution to counteract and anticipate the success of Bonaparte's crimes, and to be the first with him in injustice and oppression, altogether supersedes and renders useless and of no effect, either the reluctance with which they plundered Denmark, or the subsequent accusations they have preferred against her. With this resolution they want no plea besides. *The circumstances of the world* are their justification for passing the spunge over all the crimes and excesses of the King's enemies, and for publicly converting the war of religion, virtue, law, property, &c. into a strife, competition, and race of iniquity, with "the child and champion of Jacobinism!"

How, too, can be reconciled this "counteracting" and "anticipating" passion, with the *scrupulous* and *exact* measure of our spo-

liation? "The King acted solely upon the sense of what was due to the SECURITY of his dominions," (in bringing away the SHIP in commission, and the ships out,) and would not "carry measures of hostility be- "yond the limits of the necessity which pro- "duced them." The "circumstances of "the world, justified the taking of ships and "stores, the making the *inhabitants* feel the "distresses of a siege, and burning the ca- "capital of our ally," but they would not bear out our "counteractions" or "anticipations," in bringing away one cannon or a single regiment, or perhaps in making war against batteries and soldiers. We had a right to fire our bombs and rockets over their heads, for our aim was the inhabitants; *they* were to be made to *feel*. The *distresses* of the INHABITANTS were our means, but the ships were our object. It was the ships, and nothing but the ships, that caused our panic for the "immediate security of England and "Ireland." Bonaparte might have come over in them; we might therefore *legiti-*

merely lay our hands upon them, but to meddle with the capital, or the island, exceeded the Jacobin dispensation, unless indeed, it had been one of the Cyclades, for then it could have moved to invade us: it would have come within the scope of our *just* and *lawful* poltroonery, and "being within *the limits* of our necessity," it would have legalized our plunder* and our aggression!!!

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* It seems very material to assertain, whether the Danish plunder be considered by the Navy Board as saleable booty, or as disposeable military force in the Royal Navy. It *may* be *physically* possible to fit out about fifteen or eighteen ships, (vide the Appendix.) But as all these are worse than the only three *now* in any shape seaworthy, and as there is great danger of a ministerial display of their plunder, and of a wish to make this plunder appear formidable, &c. I think it indispensable, that the survey, by the officers of the royal yards, should not merely state the quantity of copper and of sound timber, &c. that is required to repair them for sea, but the number of artificers that must be employed upon them, in order that we may know a little, *à priori*; whether they *ought* to be repaired at all, and whether the artificers ought

How far it became a great nation, (for doubtless we were a great nation, before we were plunged into crimes by avarice, and by cowardice,) to proclaim to all the world, the panic that had seized it, and the "*immediate* danger," to which it was exposed, from the remote and improbable contingency of France taking possession of the Danish ships, I freely leave to the public consideration. I will not even dispute their value with the junior Mr. Gambier, to whose means of valuing them, the Christmas vacation has been so convenient, that he may perform this ser-

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to be removed from working upon our own British *thirty-two pounds per ton* vessels, to vamp and veneer, and dauh over for show, this spongy Holstein *timber*, (for I cannot find another word for it) with black and yellow paint, and fine new carved heads of the CROWN PRINCE, the Runick ODIN, with his beer and skulls, and KING CHRISTIAN, and all the rest of this Gothic fleet, of which one ship only was in commission, and the remainder has been rescued by the Ministry, not from Bonaparte, but the worms!!!

vice to his country, without injury to the rest of his education.—"Necessity" has been called by the sublimest of the poets, "the plea of a tyrant." But to make it the plea of tyranny and of cowardice at once, required something like "all the talents" which at present rule us, and which by the true mixture (formerly attributed to our enemies) of the monkey and the tyger, by their epigrams and their bombardments, their conflagrations and their sarcasms, by state-pleasantries and by state-atrocities, by "counteraction," and by "anticipation," and by every possible confusion and dislocation of wrong and right, of policy and folly, by the cruelty of their facetiousness, and the sneers of their inflictions, have wittily contrived to give us an enemy wherever we had a friend; to make it the interest of foes to remain, and the point of honour for neutrals to become so.

And this I do not state in this place, because it has so happened, because events

have confirmed it; but because it must have been foreknown to the Ministry, and have actually entered into their combinations while they were planning this egregious expedition. This requires no other proof, than the fourth paragraph of the first Declaration *, and the twenty-first of the second †, in which they virtually admit the temerity and indecorum (to use no other term) of their immediate application to the Russian Emperor, (whom they unguardedly style and admit to be the "*Protector of the* NORTH ‡,") for his Majesty's intercession with the Danes, in the midst of the bloody ashes of Copenhagen, to shake their murderers by the hand, and hug us to their bosom!

IN the paragraph first alluded to, they declare, they had positive information of the intention of the French Emperor to occupy

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* September 25. † December 18.

‡ Concluding words of the Royal Declaration, September 25.

Holstein, for the purpose of compelling Denmark to close the Sound; to exclude Great Britain from communication with the Continent, and to avail himself of the Danish marine, &c. The last only of these objects, however, was provided for by their expedition, and this at the certain loss of the two others. The attainment of these, our most scrupulous Statesmen judged, and have declared to be, beyond the limits of their necessity*. But is it possible, that at this very moment, *they* were not aware, that besides giving every thing Danish (but their own plunder) to *Bonaparte*, they were, at least, rivetting and cementing his new alliance with Russia, and compelling Sweden into the same vortex, if her romantic magnanimity do not prefer to suffer and to pay the retaliation and the price of the fires of Copenhagen? Do they *now* think this power has any other option or alternative? that their sole ally can hold out against the invader and the protector of the North, united and reinforced by that Denmark, whose very nerves and heart we have

transferred, by our bombs and our thefts, and our calumnies, to France and to Russia, and to every thing that promises her redress or revenge!

I SHALL now submit a few remarks upon the subsidiary justification of the Ministers in their Declaration of the 18th of December, in answer to that of his Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of all the Russias.—I say a very few, for the publication of the French Commentary upon that wonderful paper*, has induced me to withdraw from the press, and to cancel a considerable part of this Discourse. It is impossible, however, for any man, with the feelings of a Briton, to preserve silence upon the baseness, the audacity, and the infatuation of those Ministers, who, defending the desperate and violent surprise of Copenhagen, plead

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Published in the Times of the 15th instant.

their " moderation and forbearance* " with regard to Russia, and excuse the vile crime of oppressing the defenceless, by the alleged merit of sparing, managing, and respecting the powerful. Who that has a drop of English blood in his veins, can read, without something more than indignation, that his Sovereign (who had just thought it his first and paramount duty, to pounce upon the navy of his brother and ally the King of Denmark, to burn his capital, and quench its fires with the blood of the INHABITANTS) " deemed it necessary to require *specific ex-* " *planation*, with respect to the arrange- " ments of Russia with France—to abstain " from the *language of reproach*; and " although the concealment of these arrange- " ments, (the secret articles of the peace of " Tilsit, which Russia and France deny to " have any existence,) from his Majesty, " could not but confirm the impression

* Declaration, 18th December, paragraph 5.

" already received of their character and " tendency, nevertheless his Majesty di- " rected the demand of that *explanation* to " be made, not only *without asperity*, or the " *indication of any hostile disposition, but* " *with that considerate regard to the feelings* " and *situation* of the *Emperor of Russia*, " *which resulted* from the *recollection of* " *former friendship, and from confidence* " *interrupted*, but *not destroyed* *." I say, who can read such revolting meanness, and such disgusting absurdity, and in such a place, without a just horror, and an honest resentment? Good God! in what hands have we placed the honour and character of our country; what are the feelings and the thoughts of men, who, still dripping with Danish gore, plead as a merit, moderation and forbearance with Russia!! Who justify their violence towards the innocent and the weak, by their " *considerate regard*"

* Declaration, 18th December, paragraph 4.

for the strong and the guilty? who lick the feet of the powerful, and the blood of the defencess!!

DOUBTLESS there is something in this new foreign policy of ours, so hateful; some quality so hostile and repugnant to British feeling, that no art nor fraud, nor that hypocrisy, which the poet describes as the only fiend permitted by Heaven, to walk perpetually disguised and undiscovered, could have hid or concealed it. But when we see its authors and inventors, actually blazoning and illuminating with their new Jacobin gas, the turpitude and cruelty of their crimes—when they make their august Master boast and vaunt in the eyes of all the world, of his *forbearance* and *moderation* towards the Emperor of Russia, his equal in power, a prince of his own class and measure, a false friend, a mighty enemy, reeking from the desertion and treachery of *Tilsit*—when one sees all the King's *moderation* and *forbearance* exhausted upon this great, per-

fidious sovereign, and all his royal vengeance directed by the new Jacobin code and profession, bursting on the weak and innocent head of the Prince of Denmark—when one contrasts the baseness of these acts, with the folly of proclaiming and recording, and assigning them as a justification, I think I perceive all the signs of that specific insanity with which an angry God is said to visit the wretches whom He drives upon destruction!

Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos,

Was not the lofty boast, but the true and generous policy of Rome, by which she climbed to empire, and maintained it over a fascinated, willing world.

WHY we have inserted this, the noblest axiom of all the wise and generous policy of antiquity, it is for his Majesty's Jacobin advisers to explain. To them it belongs to shew and to evince, to the satisfaction of their country, upon what grounds, upon

what necessity, and for what objects, they have sacrificed our great moral pre-eminence among European nations, and what was far preferable in our own conscience and estimation, to a rivalry in vice, and a race of crime with the adult and prævalid Jacobinism of the French government. It is for them to elucidate the profound wisdom, and the preposterous retrograde ambition, which vaults at infamy, which soars only to plunge, and aspires but to sink—of which the success is loss, the accomplishment, dishonour. In God's name, what weariness and disgust of innocence have we taken, what antipathy to glory, that we should dash at once into these gulphs and abysses of unfathomable bottomless ruin and disgrace?

But it was not glory only, nor a just revenge, nor a true magnanimity, that invited our arms to the guilty banks of the Neva; but sound policy, and prudence and reason of State—It was to Cronstadt, that every wise

and honourable motive directed the "powerful counteraction" his Majesty was preparing to the violence and crimes of his enemies—It was there that the secret articles of Tilsit, if they exist, should have been demanded by the cannon's mouth—It was there that they might have been rescinded by the British sword, or the crown have fallen from the perfidious temples of Alexander: but to assume no other success than has crowned our arms at Copenhagen; we had borne away the only fleet that was really formidable in the Baltic; we had saved our brave ally, the King of Sweden; we had protected Denmark against all the possible designs of France and Russia; and virtually nullified these secret articles of Tilsit, the existence of which would not now have been a curious problem and pleading of State, but a matter of perfect indifference—Our ambassador would not have been duped and gulled at St. Petersburgh, nor our egregious Ministers be now boasting and taunt-

ing the Russian Chancery, with having temporized* and outwitted them for a few days, while the batteries of Cronstadt were mounted and garrisoned, and its moles and arsenals rendered defensible—neither would the squadron of the Russian Admiral Siniavin have eluded the British fleets, nor witnessed in the Tagus the flight of the Royal House of Braganza, for whose defence we had denied fifteen thousand of those troops who were bombarding his Majesty's *allies* at Copenhagen.' Here was a glorious prize, and a guiltless laurel—here we might have triumphed without a blush, and prevailed without remorse; and here our victorious chiefs might have ascribed their success to the favour of Providence, without an impious

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* Declaration, 18th December, paragraph 22.—The King's Ministers call the effect of the fears of the Russian Chancery for Cronstadt, the first symptoms of "reviving confidence."—What miserable drivelling is this!

mockery of the first attributes of the Divinity!

Now, as to these secret articles of Tilsit, which are the "*Causa et excusatio tantorum* "*malorum*," I shall suppress much of what I intended to say, because the French and Russian Emperors not only deny their existence, but publicly dare and challenge our Ministers to make good their accusation.

I THINK these powerful sovereigns would not so hazard their reciprocal confidence as to become partners in a common and public lie. It would not be the *interest* of either to trust so much of his true character to the observation of the other. Do I then prefer to believe that the fiction originates with our own Ministry? By no means—but I do suspect that the paper upon which they rely, (for which, as I have heard, no small share of secret-service-money has been expended) is the fabrication of Monsieur Talleyrand,

—" most authentic source*!—and that their spy has been another *Méhé de la Touche*. This argues, to be sure, but badly, for their skill and success in their new game and competition with the French government—Their anticipation has been anticipated†. But this is little to the suspicions which naturally arise from their not producing these articles either at Cronstadt or at Copenhagen; for it does look as if they themselves had, even then, some doubts of their authenticity; and there is besides, an unlucky presumption resulting from the variance in the expressions of his Majesty's two Declarations upon this subject; for, although the first speaks of the " most positive information," and " the au-

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Declaration, 25th September, paragraph 5.

† It would be a curious circumstance, if the real contriver of our plunder at Copenhagen had been Napoleon himself—If it had been owing to papers fabricated by his orders, and communicated at an expence to us, of, perhaps, £40,000 sterling, by *his* spy, in *our* pay and *service*.

thenticity of its sources*." The second softens and dwindles into "much cause of *suspicion*, and just ground of *complaint*."

THE Ruler of France, however, endeavours to prove the falsehood of the assertion of the English Ministers, by shewing, that they must have gone to Cronstadt instead of Copenhagen, if they had possessed these articles; and certainly it is easy to shew that it is there that they *ought* to have gone; but that is unluckily no proof that it is there that they would have gone. I think they are reduced to a much harder dilemma, when they are asked, why they did not produce them to the Prince of Denmark, if they really possessed, or gave credit to the paper they possessed. It must have been efficacious towards persuading his Royal Highness to *connive* with us, if we had shewn him the danger he was exposed to from French and

* Vide supra.

Russian violence, instead of our own. There is, however, a mode of proof infinitely more easy, and more irresistible, than that which the French Emperor has had recourse to, to evince the falsehood or the gullibility of the English Ministry, and that is, a reference to dates, by which it will appear to be physically impossible, that they should have been possessed of such a paper (real or fictitious) in time, to have been at all guided or induced by that document, in their views upon Copenhagen.

THE *preliminary* articles of the peace of Tilsit, were signed on the Niemen on the 8th of July, and it was not before the 22d or 23d of that month, that this event was known in London.

BUT upon a reference to the newspapers of that month, it will be found, that long before this date, the expedition to the Sound was a common head of their information, and upon the 18th of July, (four or five days

before even the *news* of the treaty of Tilsit had reached this country) they were publicly speaking of this expedition being destined against DENMARK*. On the 20th, Sir SAMUEL HOOD actually arrived at Yarmouth, with the Prince of Wales, 98 guns; the Ganges, Mars, Alfred, Spencer, Defence, Brunswick, Captain, Maida, and Arrogant, of 74 guns; besides frigates, bombs, and *flat-bottomed boats;* and Lord Cathcart's baggage actually arrived at Yarmouth on the third of that month!! a date at which I do not think the battle of *Friedland* could have been known in this country.—I am sure the details and the certainty of the event were *not*, till the 9th or 10th. And this circumstance alone demonstrates the injustice and fallacy of the charge preferred against Denmark—of accumulating stores, for France.

* Vide for instance, the Oracle of that date.

For admitting her incapability to resist the influence of Russia, that influence must have been *against* France till the peace of Tilsit, or at least till the battle of Friedland; and Denmark could not have had time, (if I were to admit she had inclination,) to purchase stores for that power, between her knowledge of these events, and the period of the embarkation of the British troops*. It follows then, I think, indisputably, that the honour of our achievement in the Baltic, belongs not to Napoleon or Talleyrand, but exclusively to our Ministers; that *their resolution was taken previous to the disasters of Russia, at Friedland,* and in contemplation of that contingency: and consequently, that neither the accumulation of stores at Copenhagen, which is disproved, nor the indisposition of the Crown Prince to defend himself, which they cannot prove, if it be not also disproved; nor finally, the real or fictitious secret arti-

* Vide supra.

cles of Tilsit, had any share whatsoever in their original plan; which arose in the deliberate determination, (since avowed in the Declaration of September 25,) to turn Jacobins, if the Russians were defeated and obliged to desert us. They put Providence in a dilemma? if he would not assist us upon the Niemen, we would have nothing more to say to Him—we would try Baal and Ashtaroth!

"Ce sont deux puissans Dieux."

But Admiral Gambier *ought to have had notice of this resolution*, as well as of the secret articles of Tilsit, and the moderation and forbearance of his Court.

I SHALL only observe, and that in a very cursory way, (because they no otherwise belong to the main object of this Discourse, than as they are connected with the credit of the *Downing-street papers*) upon two other points in the counter declaration, to that of the Court of St. Petersburgh; and these are,

first, the insult which his Majesty's Ministers deny to have intended to offer to the Emperor of Russia, in soliciting his mediation with Denmark immediately after the bombardment; and, secondly, their infatuated and foppish mistake respecting the motive of the momentary dissimulation of the Court of St. Petersburgh, after that lamentable event.

I SHALL say still less upon the insult itself, than upon their alleged unconsciousness, because, if *proper, decent, respectful,* and *diplomatic language* could have been found for it, no statesman could have wished the Russian Emperor to have remained unadmonished of the sense with which the English *public* have regarded his conduct, since the battle of Friedland. It is, however, at St. Petersburgh, and by ways partaking of personal delicacy, and "considerate regard" for his Imperial Majesty's situation, that wise and temperate Ministers would have communicated their regret, their disappointment, and their remonstrance. They would have

known, that an argument and a pleading, which is held *before all the world, cannot* be conciliatory or pacific! That taunts and epigrams, and pleasantries of state, are always unbecoming and always misplaced. They would have avoided all cavil, and all bitterness. TRUE logic, and A PROUD SINCERITY, ARE THE SUBLIME OF A STATE PAPER! Our late magnanimous ally had fallen, but he was to be reclaimed, and not exasperated; to be won back by gentleness and conviction, and not plunged and driven on by unfeeling chicanery: we had but one alternative with the Court of Russia, if we placed any credit in the paper we had received as the secret articles of Tilsit—We were to punish, or to reclaim. To Cronstadt, and to *that fleet*, with which, we may *now*, *in fact*, and at no great distance of time be menaced, we might have directed our category and our thunder. But if we did not, our intercourse should have been mild and conciliatory. ALL Russia was not *then* against us, nor all mankind. But that we were *intent* to *insult* the

ally we had lost, is not only evident from the pert and biting style of the Westminster Declaration, but from the material confession contained in it, that in the very moment of our burning Copenhagen, we applied to the "PROTECTOR of the NORTH," to mediate for us a peace with his *protégé*!! And what do our Ministers say in excuse, that they did not *mean* an insult to the Emperor, as if any man in the use of his faculties, could think a greater insult could be offered or devised! They fall suddenly, and as they confess, without any offence received from it, upon one of the Northern States, then our ally, and protected by the Emperor of Russia, but a moment before that, our ally also; and then, without the loss of an hour, they entreat the "PROTECTOR of the NORTH," to mediate a peace between them and their victim!!! Where were the articles of Tilsit then? If they did not possess them, all their miserable defence has crumbled to the ground. If they did, and if they be not fictitious, and sent to them from the bureau of Talleyrand, how can

they pretend, that it was no insult, thus *cleverly* and *adroitly* to thwart and anticipate, and disappoint the design and policy of the "Protector of the North," and then to apply to him as a disinterested or anxious friend, to accommodate our *trifling difference?* I do not think, that the Emperor of Russia has deserved to be vindicated; but I do know, and some of his Majesty's Cabinet know also, the indignation which that Sovereign expressed upon hearing of our Spanish piracy in 1804, and the cutting opprobrious terms in which that indignation was expressed—At that time he was not the indented ally of France, and he never was the "protector" of Spain. It would not, therefore, be very improbable, that our violence and perfidy towards *Denmark*, should have irritated his Imperial Majesty from sincere and virtuous feelings—But to concede to the ministry, that nothing honest, manly, or honourable, can co-exist with hostility (even forced) towards ourselves—it remains for them to shew how it came, that they were

not the more aware of the present motives and interests of his Imperial Majesty; more cogent and powerful to resent *this* act of Jacobinism in the North, than its elder brother in the West. For if they are to be trusted, (and surely any evidence is good against the deponent himself) they knew how cunningly they had outwitted the Emperor, and what secret soreness he was feeling, while they were so happily tickling him in the wound, and begging plaster and lint for their own ulcers!!

If they did not, therefore, mean to insult the Russian Emperor, it must be, because at that time, they either had not received, or did not place reliance in, or never meant to allege and bring forward, *their* copy of the secret treaty of Tilsit.

As to the other part of their defence, which is the last upon which I shall comment, (for the present at least) namely, their allegation, that " his Majesty cannot forget,

" that the first symptons of reviving confi-
" dence, since the peace of *Tilsit*, the only
" prospect of success in the endeavours of
" his Majesty's ambassador to restore the
" ancient good understanding between *Great*
" *Britain* and *Russia*, appeared when the
" intelligence of the siege of *Copenhagen*
" had been recently received at *St. Peters-*
" *burgh*."

It is only worthy of remark, in as much as it shows how miserably they were at that time the dupes of their over-fond and sanguine hopes, and what little credit they gave to their " secret articles." For if they really believed in the authenticity of this paper, which they never, by the way, dared to pull out of their pockets, it is absolutely *impossible* that they could have looked upon the arrival of the news at St. Petersburgh, of the siege of Copenhagen, as a favourable and auspicious time for " reviving confidence, and the re-
" storation of the ancient good understand-
" ing." What time, in the name of sense,

and truth, and simplicity?—the very precise moment of the Emperor's disappointment and first poignant chagrin!

In the same names, which one now scarce ventures to pronounce, I demand by what infatuation it happened, that our Envoys and our Ministers could not *then* perceive the Motive of the Russian temporization; and by what audacity they can now dissemble or deny it? Is it not clearer than the meridian sun, that they feared for their own ships, and dreaded our Jacobin anticipations at Cronstadt; and that they gulled our diplomatists while they put Cronstadt (which was as much within the reach of our *suddenness*, as the smoaking Copenhagen) in a state of defence; not knowing the "considerate regards" of our government for powerful and mighty States, or suspecting, at that time, that the thunder of Great Britain menaced only the weak and the innocent!

I HAVE done—I hope I have done. I have shewn our folly and depravity, and that they are equal to each other; and I have demanded and provoked *that justice*, which a great and virtuous nation owes, and can do, to itself and to the world, in perfect conformity to the laws, the maxims, and the usage of its ancestors. In the case of our piratical spoliation of Spain, I was answered by the "quantity, the proceeds of our lawless "prize!"—our "DROITS of the ADMIRAL-"TY!" In the *present* instance, our plunder will not satisfy the fifth part of the expence of our expedition; it will not pay the merchant-freight of bringing it home (and bringing nothing home) to our sea ports; and it is for *this* that "we have OUR ETERNAL JEWEL GIVEN TO THE COMMON ENEMY OF MAN!" I cannot be silenced *now*, by the *value* of our crime; the *per centage*, *poundage*, and AD-VALOREM of our iniquity. On the contrary, it will cost less than nothing, to restore our booty. But if a generous and injured Friend, or Enemy, shall I

call the Prince of Denmark! will not receive it at our hands, *without other expiations* that we cannot or will not make, "*Let it not be lawful for it to go into the Treasury.*" IT IS THE PRICE OF BLOOD! Let it purchase the *Potters Field;* and, in its classic sense, remain for ever the pious horror, the SACRED detestation, the BIDENTAL OF THE COUNTRY!!!

I HAVE heard something of UNANIMITY as the *cry*, the *mot-fin*, the NO-POPERY of the moment. I will not discuss it—I will not reason upon it. The *Unanimity* that is to save a nation, cannot be prepared (consent and implicit submission to these new and dangerous councils.) I trust, however, the *unanimity of the country* will appear and be pronounced, and indisputably asserted, upon this, the *last* question that can be proposed to a free and honourable nation. I think there are very few voices in the empire, and a very small portion even of the Cabinet, which can look at what has taken place, and

what is impending, with a fixed eye and a placid conscience. Should there be more than I am aware of, who will now dare to advise adherence to these horrid principles, and perseverance in these "TERRIBLE COUNTERACTIONS!" I more than fear, I am certain, that by near and inevitable consequences, they will draw down the worst ruin, disgraceful ruin,

"By the worst means, the worst,"

Upon their country, and bring down the grey hairs of the King with sorrow to the grave!!!

LONDON, *January* 18, 1808.

THE APPENDIX.

No. I.

Narrative of Measures Pursued by the Officers who Remonstrated against ceding their Rank to Sir Home Popham.

THE Officers who felt themselves so much hurt at the appointment of Sir Home Popham to be Captain of the Fleet, as to represent their feelings on that occasion to the Commander in Chief, waited upon him as in conformity with the law and usage of the service*, and temperately, quietly, and respectfully, made known their grievance to him. After some conversation, Admiral Gambier, though not perhaps approving the act, was so far from condemning the mode of application, that he said to those officers, that he felt *himself obliged* by the delicate manner in which they

* The articles of war provide for the quiet and temperate representation of grievances to the Admiral or Commander in Chief.

proceeded; and recommended to them to address an official letter to him on the subject. This recommendation of the Commander in Chief produced letter No. 2. The officers, so far from menacing to withdraw their services from the fleet, as has been falsely and maliciously asserted, assured the Admiral they were *ready* to proceed with the expedition, *that* they should cautiously avoid every measure that had the appearance of party or cabal: and neither invite or allow any other Captains to join with them, but keep their measures and feelings to themselves. The pledge they voluntarily gave was faithfully kept. The expedition sailed in a few days after, and in this situation they proceeded to sea.

No official reply was ever made to letter No. 2. But during the expedition the officers were separately shewn by the Commander in Chief, a private letter from the First Lord of the Admiralty, in which, "he condemned them for their interference in the administration of naval affairs. Expressing surprize that any objection should be made to the appointment of Sir Home Popham, as none had ever been made to that of commissioner Captain Bowen, and adding he felt too much regard for the services of the Officers, to lay their letter before the Board of Admiralty."

THE Officers replied, that their sentiments and feelings were unchanged, and they felt so much aggrieved and humi-

liated in being called upon to cede their rank to Sir Home Popham, that they must press being relieved from their painful sensations as soon as the Public service could allow.

THE fall of the Danish fleet produced a promotion of Admirals, which secured two of the officers from the grievance they complained of. The third on his return from the Baltic, was placed under orders that relieved him also from the painful situation.

THE grievance was removed, and in a manner flattering to the two officers who bore the rank of established Commodores. They might justly have been accused of indulging a disposition rather tending to embarrass than relieve themselves from an injury, had they on their return continued to urge their original remonstrance. It appeared essential to Sir Samuel Hood and Rear Admiral Keats, both of whom have been in London since their return, to justify themselves from the imputation that appeared to be cast upon them in the private letter of Lord Mulgrave's, before noticed. That has been done, I have no doubt, in a manner perfectly satisfactory to Lord Mulgrave, and equally so to themselves. Their feelings have been their guide.—Their object was never connected with party, and the moment they were placed in a situation that secured them from the indignity they complained of, and re-

stored them to their natural seniority over Sir Home Popham, all *personal* subject of complaint was done away.

Note.—Although it is ordered by the naval instructions, that a Captain of the Fleet shall be either a flag officer or one of the senior Captains of the Navy, the remonstrating Officers were not ignorant that *one** precedent could have been adduced of an appointment of Captain of the Fleet as junior as Sir Home Popham. But where, as in this case, the time of *actual* employment has been very limited; where the Officer had never served in a fleet; and other objections occurred; they considered—and consider they forced a fair and legitimate subject of remonstrance, especially as two of them very much his seniors were (by the new naval restrictions) though established Commodores, called upon to cede their rank to him at Councils and Courts-martial.

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* Captain Bowen.—If Sir Home Popham's services had been as regular as those of Captain Bowen, and he had not met the public disapprobation of the Admiralty, and the severe censure of a court martial, and had not pursued rather a *speculative* than a regular line of conduct, no objection would ever have been made to him.

No. II.

LETTER TO ADMIRAL GAMBIER, &c. &c. &c.

North Yarmouth, July 23, 1807.

SIR,

WE beg leave to represent to you, the extreme sorrow and concern, with which, as senior Captains in the Navy, we are penetrated, in finding ourselves placed in situations that in any degree subject us to an inferiority to Captain Sir Home Popham.

WE are sensible that it belongs to his Majesty, to establish the gradations of rank, and we have been bred to respect and venerate his authority.—We wish simply to convey our feelings—not to remark on the services or pretensions of any one; waving, therefore, those of the present Captain of the Fleet, as much as circumstances will admit; and trusting, that our regular, direct, unimpeached, and almost uninterrupted services, will afford the most unequivocal denial to the supposition of our being actuated by any indirect or party motives; we anxiously hope, Sir, that you will take such measures as you

may deem expedient, to relieve us from the painful sensations we at present experience.

THE principles under which we have been brought up, induce us to make any sacrifices that the service of our country may require: we are *ready* to proceed on any immediate service; but we rely, that as early measures will be taken, without injury to the service, as can be effected, to relieve us from the humiliating situations in which, by the appointment of Sir Home Popham as Captain of the Fleet, we find ourselves placed.

We have the honour to be, Sir,

With respect,

Your most obedient humble Servants,

(Signed) SAMUEL HOOD.
R. G. KEATS.
ROBERT STOPFORD.

To Admiral Gambier, &c. &c. &c.

No. III.

Comparative Services of the Remonstrating Captains, and Sir Home Popham's.

THE services of the three Remonstrating Captains, have been *as* regular, *as* continued, and *as* persevering, as that of any Officers in the Navy. From their earliest entrance into it, they had undeviatingly attached themselves to its plainest and *fairest* principles and pursuits; a long, uninterrupted course of service, had been passed by them without blemish or suspicion; they had severally served as Captains under Earls Howe and St. Vincent—under Lords, Nelson, Hood, Gardner, Collingwood, and other officers of high rank and character. Each had commanded ships of the line in action, and received medals, and the thanks of their country. Each had commanded squadrons as established Commodores, with the rank of Rear Admirals, and acquitted themselves of their duty with approbation.—At the commencement of the war

with France in 1793, two of them had been eleven years in the command of sloops of war or frigates; and all of them three years post, with the rank of Colonels in the army. At this period, the Captain of the Fleet commanded a merchant ship under foreign colours—himself a Lieutenant of the Navy, and it has been said, a Burgher of Ostend; employed in a traffic prejudicial to the commercial rights and prosperity of the East India Company!!

THE services of the Remonstrating Captains, when called upon to cede their rank to Sir Home Popham, were from *seventeen* to *nineteen* years *post**, during which time they were almost constantly employed; whilst the actual services of Sir Home Popham little exceeded *four years*. He had *never* served as Captain under any Admiral—had never been in a line of battle—nor had ever commanded a ship in action. It is true, he had been honoured beyond all precedent with *commands*. His conduct in one, after meeting the disapprobation of the Admiralty, became the

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* I believe Sir Samuel Hood served as Post Capt.... 17 years.
Rear Admiral Keats also served..... 17 years.
Captain Stopford, I believe, full..... 15 years.
Sir Home Popham little more than, I believe..... 4 years.

subject of parliamentary inquiry. A second had been productive of the severe censure of a Court-martial; from which sentence, hitherto found a bar almost insurmountable to advancement in the navy, he was raised, without precedent, considering these circumstances and his short services, and almost without a pause, to a situation, notwithstanding the rank and services of the Remonstrating Officers, that gave him a seniority over them. Under such unprecedented circumstances, they considered *and consider* themselves justified in having adopted the legitimate mode of remonstrance, to procure redress of a grievance.

THE Remonstrating Officers acknowledge no inferiority of naval information or ability to Sir Home Popham. Their actions have corresponded with their professions; and they have not been accustomed to view with respect, those whose conduct has been marked by *speculative notions*.—It has been said, the *local* knowledge of Sir Home Popham, made his appointment, as Captain of the Fleet, *requisite*. Men of versatile talents, have local knowledge in all parts of the world. The Remonstrating Captains did not discover *any extraordinary advantage* which the public service derived from his appointment at Copenhagen: and on Admiral Gambier's advancing it as an argument at Yarmouth, he was reminded by the Captains—that he might as easily derive all the advantages he promised himself from it, by taking him in a situation that would

not be offensive to them, as in that in which he had been appointed to.

Note.—One of the Remonstrating Captains, who commanded a frigate in 1790, was actually employed to cruize for El Trusco, the foreign merchant ship commanded by Sir Home Popham, then on her outward-bound voyage to the East Indies. She was stopped by the Brilliant frigate, Captain Mark Robinson, on her homeward-bound voyage in 1793 or 1794.

No. IV.

COPY *of the* SUMMONS *sent to the Governor of Copenhagen, with his Answer to it, dated Sept.* 1, 1807.

British Head Quarters, before Copenhagen, Sept. 1.

SIR,

WE, the Commanders in Chief of his Majesty's sea and land forces now before Copenhagen, judge it expedient at this time to summon you to surrender the place, for the purpose of avoiding the farther effusion of blood, by giving up a defence which it is evident cannot long be continued.

THE King our gracious Master, used every endeavour to settle the matter now in dispute, in the most conciliating manner, through his diplomatic servants.

To convince his Danish Majesty, and all the world, of the reluctance with which his Majesty finds himself compelled to have recourse to arms, we, the undersigned, at this moment when our troops are before your gates, and our batteries ready to open, do renew to you the offer of the same advantageous and conciliatory terms which were proposed through his Majesty's Ministers to your Court.

If you will consent to deliver up the Danish fleet, and to our carrying it away, it shall be held in deposit for his Danish Majesty, and shall be restored with all its equipments, in as good a state as it is received, as soon as the provisions of a general peace shall remove the necessity which has occasioned this demand.

The property of all sorts which has been captured since the commencement of hostilities will be restored to its owners, and the union between the united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and Denmark may be renewed.

But if this offer is rejected now, it cannot be repeated. The captured property, public and private, must then belong to the captors; and the city, when taken, must share the fate of conquered places.

We must request an early decision, because, in the present advanced position of the troops so near your glacis, the most prompt and vigorous attack is indispensable, and delay would be improper.

We therefore expect to receive your decision by

We have the honour to be, &c.

J. GAMBIER.
CATHCART.

To His Excellency, General Peyman,
Governor of Copenhagen, &c.

ANSWER.

Copenhagen, Sept. 1.

My Lords,

OUR fleet, our own indisputable property, we are convinced, is as safe in his Danish Majesty's hands as ever it can be in those of the King of England, as our Master never intended any hostilities against your's.

If you are cruel enough to endeavour to destroy a city, that has not given any the least cause to such a treatment at your hands, it must submit to its fate; but honour and duty bid us reject a proposal unbecoming an independent Power; and we are resolved to repel every attack, and defend to the utmost the city and our good cause, for which we are ready to lay down our lives.

The only proposal in my power to make, in order to prevent farther effusion of blood, is to send to my Royal Master, for learning his final resolution, with respect to the contents of your letter, if you will grant a passport for this purpose. I am, &c.

(Signed) PEYMAN.

No. V.

ARTICLES *of* CAPITULATION *for the Town and Citadel of Copenhagen, agreed upon between Major-General the Right Hon. Sir Arthur Wellesley, K. B. Sir Home Popham, Knight of Malta, and Captain of the Fleet, and Lieutenant-Colonel George Murray, Deputy Quarter-Master-General of the British Forces, being thereto duly authorized by James Gambier, Esq. Admiral of the Blue, and Commander in Chief of his Britannic Majesty's Ships and Vessels in the Baltic Sea, and by Lieutenant-General the Right Hon. Lord Cathcart, Knight of the Thistle, Commander in Chief of his Britannic Majesty's Forces in Zealand, and the North of the Continent of Europe, on the one part; and by Major-General Walterstorff, Knight of the Order of Dannebrog, Chamberlain to the King, and Colonel of the North Zealand Regiment of Infantry, Rear Admiral Lütken, and I. H. Kerchoff, Aid-de-Camp to his Danish Majesty, being duly authorized by his Excellency Major-General Peyman, Knight of the Order of Dannebrog, and Commander in Chief of his Danish Majesty's Forces in the Island of Zealand, on the other part.*

ARTICLE I.

WHEN the Capitulation shall have been signed and ratified, the troops of his Britannic Majesty are to be put in possession of the Citadel.

II. A GUARD of his Britannic Majesty's troops, shall be placed in the Dock-yards.

III. THE ships and vessels of war of every description, with all the naval stores belonging to his Danish Majesty, shall be delivered into the charge of such persons as shall be appointed by the Commanders in Chief of his Britannic Majesty's forces; and they are to be put in immediate possession of the Dock-yards, and all the buildings and storehouses belonging thereto.

IV. THE store-ships and transports in the service of his Britannic Majesty are to be allowed, if necessary, to come into the harbour, for the purpose of embarking such stores and troops as they have brought into this island.

V. As soon as the ships shall have been removed from the Dock-yard, or within six weeks from the date of this Capitulation, or sooner, if possible, the troops of his Britannic Majesty shall deliver up the Citadel to the troops of his Danish Majesty, in the state in which it shall be found when they occupy it. His Britannic Majesty's troops shall likewise, within the before-mentioned time, or sooner, if possible, be embarked from the Island of Zealand.

VI. FROM the date of this Capitulation, hostilities shall cease throughout the Island of Zealand.

VII. No person whatsoever shall be molested, and all property, public or private, with the exception of the ships

and vessels of war, and the naval stores before-mentioned, belonging to his Danish Majesty, shall be respected; and all civil and military officers in the service of his Danish Majesty, shall continue in the full exercise of their authority throughout the Island of Zealand; and every thing shall be done which can tend to produce union and harmony between the two nations.

VIII. ALL prisoners taken on both sides shall be unconditionally restored, and those officers who are prisoners on parole shall be released from its effect.

"IX. ANY English property that may have been sequestrated, in consequence of the existing hostilities, shall be restored to the owners.

THIS Capitulation shall be ratified by the respective Commanders in Chief, and the ratifications shall be exchanged before twelve o'clock at noon this day.

DONE at Copenhagen, this 7th day of September, 1807.

(Signed) ARTHUR WELLESLEY.
HOME POPHAM.
GEORGE MURRAY.

Ratifié par moi,

(Signée) PEYMAN.

No. VI.

DECLARATION, dated Sept. 25, 1807.

HIS Majesty owes to himself, and to Europe, a frank exposition of the motives which have dictated his late measures in the Baltic.

HIS Majesty has delayed this exposition only in the hope of that more amicable arrangement with the Court of Denmark, which it was Majesty's first wish and endeavour to obtain—for which he was ready to make great efforts and great sacrifices: and of which he never lost sight, even in the moment of the most decisive hostility.

DEEPLY as the disappointment of this hope has been felt by his Majesty, he has the consolation of reflecting, that no exertion was left untried, on his part, to produce a different result. And while he laments the cruel necessity which has obliged him to have recourse to acts of hostility, against a nation with which it was his Majesty's most earnest desire to have established the relations of common interest and alliance; his Majesty feels confident, that, in the eyes of Europe and of the world, the justification of his

conduct will be found, in the commanding and indispensable duty, paramount to all others, amongst the obligations of a Sovereign, of providing, while there was yet time, for the immediate security of his people.

His Majesty had received the most positive information of the determination of the present Ruler of France, to occupy, with a military force, the territory of Hosltein, for the purpose of excluding Great Britain from all her accustomed channels of communication with the Continent; of inducing or compelling the court of Denmark to close the passage of the Sound against the British commerce and navigation; and of availing himself of the aid of the Danish marine, for the invasion of Great Britain and of Ireland.

Confident as his Majesty was of the authenticity of the sources from which this intelligence was derived, and confirmed in the credit which he gave to it, as well by the notorious and repeated declarations of the enemy, and by his recent occupation of the towns and territories of other neutral states, as by the preparations actually made for collecting a hostile force upon the frontiers of his Danish Majesty's Continental dominions; his Majesty would yet willingly have forborne to act upon this intelligence, until the complete and practical disclosure of the plan had made manifest to all the world the absolute necessity of resisting it.

His Majesty did forbear, as long as there could be a doubt of the urgency of the danger, or a hope of an effectual counteraction to it in the means or in the dispositions of Denmark.

But his Majesty could not but recollect, that when, at the close of the former war, the Court of Denmark engaged in a hostile confederacy against Great Britain, the apology offered by that Court, for so unjustifiable an abandonment of a neutrality which his Majesty had never ceased to respect, was founded on its avowed inability to resist the operation of external influence, and the threats of a formidable neighbouring power. His Majesty could not, but compare the degree of influence, which at that time determined the decision of the Court of Denmark, in violation of positive engagements, solemnly contracted but six months before, with the increased operation which France had now the means of giving to the same principle of intimidation, with kingdoms prostrate at her feet, and with the population of nations under her banners.

Nor was the danger less imminent than certain. Already the army destined for the invasian of Holstein was assembling on the violated territory of neutral Hamburgh: and, Holstein once occupied, the island of Zealand was at the mercy of France, and the Navy of Denmark at her disposal.

It is true, a British force might have found its way into the Baltic, and checked, for a time, the movements of the Danish marine. But the season was approaching when that precaution would no longer have availed, and when his Majesty's fleet must have retired from that sea, and permitted France, in undisturbed security, to accumulate the means of offence against his Majesty's dominions.

Yet, even under these circumstances in calling upon Denmark for the satisfaction and security which his Majesty was compelled to require, and in demanding the only pledge by which that security could be rendered effectual—the temporary possession of that fleet, which was the chief inducement to France for forcing Denmark into hostilities with Great Britain; his Majesty accompanied this demand with the *offer of* every condition which could tend to reconcile *it* to the interests and to the feelings of the Court of Denmark.

It was for Denmark herself to state the terms and stipulations which she might require.

If Denmark was apprehensive, that the surrender of her fleet would be resented by France as an act of contrivance, his Majesty had prepared a force of such formidable magnitude, as must have made concession justifiable even in the estimation of France, by rendering resistance altogether unavailing.

If Denmark was really prepared to resist the demands of France, and to maintain her independence, his Majesty proffered his co-operation for her defence—naval, military, and pecuniary aid, the guarantee of her European territories, and the security and extension of her colonial possessions.

That the sword has been drawn in the execution of a service indispensable to the safety of his Majesty's dominions, is matter of sincere and painful regret to his Majesty. That the state and circumstances of the world are such as to have required and justified the measures of self-preservation, to which his Majesty has found himself under the necessity of resorting, is a truth which his Majesty deeply deplores, but for which he is in no degree responsible.

His Majesty has long carried on a most unequal contest, of scrupulous forbearance against unrelenting violence and oppression. But that forbearance has its bounds.—When the design was openly avowed, and already but too far advanced towards its accomplishment, of subjecting the powers of Europe to one universal usurpation, and of combining them by terror or by force in a confederacy against the maritime rights and political existence of this kingdom, it became necessary for his Majesty to anticipate the success of a system, not more fatal to his interests

than to those of the powers who were destined to be the instruments of its execution.

It was time that the effects of that dread, which France has inspired into the nations of the world, should be counteracted by an exertion of the power of Great Britain, called for by the exigency of the crisis, and proportioned to the magnitude of the danger.

Notwithstanding the declaration of war on the part of the Danish Government, it still remains for Denmark to determine, whether war shall continue between the two nations. His Majesty still proffers an amicable arrangement. He is anxious to sheathe the sword, which he has been most reluctantly compelled to draw. He is ready to demonstrate to Denmark, and to the world, that having acted solely upon the sense of what was due to the security of his own dominions, he is not desirous, from any other motive, or for any object of advantage or aggrandisement, to carry measures of hostility beyond the limits of the necessity which has produced them.

Westminster, Sept. 25, 1807.

No. VII.

DECLARATION, dated December 18, 1807.

THE Declaration issued at St. Petersburgh, by his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, has excited in his Majesty's mind the strongest sensations of astonishment and regret.

HIS Majesty was not unaware of the nature of those secret engagements which had been imposed upon Russia in the conferences of Tilsit. But his Majesty had entertained the hope, that a review of the transactions of that unfortunate negotiation, and a just estimate of its effects upon the glory of the Russian name, and upon the interests of the Russian empire, would have induced his Imperial Majesty to extricate himself from the embarrassment of those new counsels and connections which he had adopted in a moment of despondency and alarm, and to return to a policy more congenial to the principles which he has so invariably professed, and more conducive to the honour of his Crown, and to the prosperity of his dominions.

THIS hope has dictated to his Majesty the utmost forbearance and moderation in all his diplomatic intercourse

with the Court of St. Petersburgh since the peace of Tilsit.

His Majesty had much cause for suspicion, and just ground of complaint. But he abstained from the language of reproach. His Majesty deemed it necessary to require specific explanation with respect to those arrangements with France, the concealment of which from his Majesty could not but confirm the impression already received of their character and tendency. But his Majesty nevertheless directed the demand of that explanation to be made, not only without asperity or the indication of any hostile disposition, but with that considerate regard to the feelings and situation of the Emperor of Russia, which resulted from the recollection of former friendship, and from confidence interrupted but not destroyed.

The Declaration of the Emperor of Russia proves that the object of his Majesty's forbearance and moderation has not been attained. It proves, unhappily, that the influence of that power, which is equally and essentially the enemy both of Great Britain and of Russia, has acquired a decided ascendancy in the counsels of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh; and has been able to excite a causeless enmity between two nations, whose long-established connection, and whose mutual interests prescribed the most intimate union and co-operation.

His Majesty deeply laments the extension of the calamities of war. But, called upon as he is, to defend himself against an act of unprovoked hostility, his Majesty is anxious to refute in the face of the world the pretexts by which that act is attempted to be justified.

The Declaration asserts, that his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, has twice taken up arms in a cause in which the interest of Great Britain was more direct than his own; and founds upon this assertion, the charge against Great Britain, of having neglected to second and support the military operations of Russia.

His Majesty willingly does justice to the motives which originally engaged Russia in the great struggle against France. His Majesty avows with equal readiness the interest which Great Britain has uniformly taken in the fates and fortunes of the powers of the Continent. But it would surely be difficult to prove that Great Britain, who was herself in a state of hostility with Prussia when the war broke out between Prussia and France, had an interest and a duty more direct in espousing the Prussian quarrel than the Emperor of Russia, the Ally of his Prussian Majesty, the Protector of the North of Europe, and the Guarantee of the Germanic Constitution.

It is not in a public Declaration that his Majesty can discuss the policy of having at any particular period of

the war, effected, or omitted to effect, disembarkations of troops on the coasts of Naples. But the instance of the war with the Porte is still more singularly chosen to illustrate the charge against Great Britain of indifference to the interests of her ally: a war undertaken by Great Britain at the instigation of Russia, and solely for the purpose of maintaining Russian interests against the influence of France.

If, however, the peace of Tilsit is indeed to be considered as the consequence and the punishment of the imputed inactivity of Great Britain, his Majesty cannot but regret that the Emperor of Russia should have resorted to so precipitate and fatal a measure, at the moment when he had received distinct assurances that his Majesty was making the most strenuous exertions to fulfil the wishes and expectations of his ally; (assurances which his Imperial Majesty received and acknowledged with apparent confidence and satisfaction) and when his Majesty was, in fact, prepared to employ for the advancement of the common objects of the war, those forces which, after the Peace of Tilsit, he was under the necessity of employing, to disconcert a combination directed against his own immediate interests and security.

The vexation of Russian Commerce by Great Britain, is, in truth, little more than an imaginary grievance.—Upon a diligent examination, made by his Majesty's com-

mand, of the records of the British Court of Admiralty, there has been discovered only a solitary instance in the course of the present war, of the condemnation of a vessel really Russian; a vessel which had carried naval stores to a port of the common enemy. There are but few instances of Russian vessels detained; and none in which justice has been refused to a party regularly complaining of such detention. It is therefore matter of surprise as well as of concern to his Majesty, that the Emperor of Russia should have condescended to bring forward a complaint which, as it cannot be seriously felt by those in whose behalf it is urged, might appear to be intended to countenance those exaggerated declamations, by which France perseveringly endeavours to inflame the jealousy of other countries, and to justify her own inveterate animosity against Great Britain.

THE Peace of Tilsit was followed by an offer of mediation on the part of the Emperor of Russia, for the conclusion of a peace between Great Britain and France; which it is asserted that his Majesty refused.

HIS Majesty did not refuse the mediation of the Emperor of Russia, although the offer of it was accompanied by circumstances of concealment, which might well have justified his refusal. The articles of the Treaty of Tilsit were not communicated to his Majesty; and specifically that article of the treaty in virtue of which the mediation

was proposed, and which prescribed a limited time for the return of his Majesty's answer to that proposal. And his Majesty was thus led into an apparent compliance with a limitation so offensive to the dignity of an independent Sovereign. But the answer so returned by his Majesty, was not a refusal; it was a conditional acceptance. The conditions required by his Majesty, were—a statement of the basis upon which the enemy was disposed to treat; and a communication of the articles of the Peace of Tilsit. The first of these conditions was precisely the same which the Emperor of Russia had himself annexed not four months before, to his own acceptance of the proffered mediation of the Emperor of Austria. The second was one, which his Majesty would have had a right to require, even as the ally of his Imperial Majesty; but which it would have been highly improvident to omit, when he was invited to confide to his Imperial Majesty the care of his honour and of his interests.

But even if these conditions (neither of which has been fulfilled, although the fulfilment of them has been repeatedly required by his Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh) had not been in themselves perfectly natural and necessary; there were not wanting considerations which might have warranted his Majesty in endeavouring, with more than ordinary anxiety, to ascertain the views and intentions of the Emperor of Russia, and the precise nature and effect of the new relations which his Imperial Majesty a d contracted.

THE complete abandonment of the interests of the King of Prussia, (who had twice rejected proposals of separate peace, from a strict adherence to his engagements with his Imperial Ally,) and the character of those provisions which the Emperor of Russia was contented to make for his own interests in the negotiations of Tilsit, presented no encouraging prospect of the result of any exertions which his Imperial Majesty might be disposed to employ in favour of Great Britain.

IT is not, while a French army still occupies and lays waste the remaining dominions of the King of Prussia, in spite of the stipulations of the Prussian treaty of Tilsit; while contributions are arbitrarily exacted by France from that remnant of the Prussian monarchy, such as, in its entire and most flourishing state, the Prussian monarchy would have been unable to discharge; while the surrender is demanded, in time of peace, of Prussian fortresses, which had not been reduced during the war; and while the power of France is exercised over Prussia with such shameless tyranny, as to designate and demand for instant death, individuals, subjects of his Prussian Majesty, and resident in his dominions, upon a charge of disrespect towards the French government;—it is not while all these things are done and suffered, under the eyes of the Emperor of Russia, and without his interference on behalf of his ally, that his Majesty can feel himself called upon to account to Europe, for having hesitated to repose an uncondi-

tional confidence in the efficacy of his Imperial Majesty's mediation.

NOR, even if that mediation had taken full effect, if a peace had been concluded under it, and that peace guaranteed by his Imperial Majesty, could his Majesty have placed implicit reliance on the stability of any such arrangement, after having seen the Emperor of Russia openly transfer to France the sovereignty of the Ionian republic, the independence of which his Imperial Majesty had recently and solemnly guaranteed.

BUT while the alleged rejection of the Emperor of Russia's mediation, between Great Britain and France, is stated as a just ground of his Imperial Majesty's resentment, his Majesty's request of that mediation, for the re-establishment of peace between Great Britain and Denmark, is represented as an insult which it was beyond the bounds of his Imperial Majesty's moderation to endure.

HIS Majesty feels himself under no obligation to offer any atonement or apology to the Emperor of Russia for the expedition against Copenhagen. It is not for those who were parties to the secret arrangements of Tilsit, to demand satisfaction for a measure to which those arrangements gave rise, and by which one of the objects of them has been happily defeated.

His Majesty's justification of the expedition against Copenhagen is before the world. The Declaration of the Emperor of Russia would supply whatever was wanting in it, if any thing could be wanting to convince the most incredulous of the urgency of that necessity under which his Majesty acted.

But until the Russian Declaration was published, his Majesty had no reason to suspect that any opinions which the Emperor of Russia might entertain of the transactions at Copenhagen could be such as to preclude his Imperial Majesty from undertaking, at the request of Great Britain, that same office of Mediator, which he had assumed with so much alacrity on the behalf of France. Nor can his Majesty forget that the first symptoms of reviving confidence, since the peace of Tilsit, the only prospect of success in the endeavours of his Majesty's Ambassador to restore the ancient good understanding between Great Britain and Russia, appeared when the intelligence of the siege of Copenhagen had been recently received at St. Petersburgh.

The inviolability of the Baltic Sea, and the reciprocal guaranties of the powers that border upon it, guaranties said to have been contracted with the knowledge of the British Government, are stated as aggravations of his Majesty's proceedings in the Baltic. It cannot be intended to represent his Majesty as having at any time ac-

quiesced in the priciples upon which the inviolability of the Baltic is maintained; however his Majesty may, at particular periods, have forborne, for special reasons influencing his conduct at the time, to act in contradiction to them. Such forbearance never could have applied but to a state of peace and real neutrality in the North; and his Majesty most assuredly could not be expected to recur to it, after France has been suffered to establish herself in undisputed sovereignty along the whole coast of the Baltic Sea, from Dantzic to Lubec.

But the higher the value which the Emperor of Russia places on the engagements respecting the tranquillity of the Baltic, which he describes himself as inheriting from his immediate predecessors, the Empress Catherine and the Emperor Paul, the less justly can his Imperial Majesty resent the appeal made to him by his Majesty as the guarantee of the peace to be concluded between Great Britain and Denmark. In making that appeal, with the utmost confidence and sincerity, his Majesty neither intended, nor can he imagine that he offered any insult to the Emperor of Russia. Nor can his Majesty conceive that, in proposing to the Prince Royal terms of peace, such as the most successful war on the part of Denmark could hardly have been expected to extort from Great Britain, his Majesty rendered himself liable to the imputation, either of exasperating the resentment, or of outraging the dignity, of Denmark.

His Majesty has thus replied to all the different accusations by which the Russian Government labours to justify the rupture of a connection which has subsisted for ages, with reciprocal advantage to Great Britain and Russia; and attempts to disguise the operation of that external influence by which Russia is driven into unjust hostilities for interests not her own.

The Russian Declaration proceeds to announce the several conditions on which alone these hostilities can be terminated, and the intercourse of the two countries renewed.

His Majesty has already had occasion to assert, that justice has in no instance been denied to the claims of his Imperial Majesty's subjects.

The termination of the war with Denmark has been so anxiously sought by his Majesty, that it cannot be necessary for his Majesty to renew any professions upon that subject. But his Majesty is at a loss to reconcile the Emperor of Russia's present anxiety for the completion of such an arrangement, with his Imperial Majesty's recent refusal to contribute his good offices for effecting it.

The requisition of his Imperial Majesty for the immediate conclusion, by his Majesty, of a peace with France, is as extraordinary in the substance, as it is offensive in

the manner. His Majesty has at no time declined to treat with France, when France has professed a willingness to treat on an admissible basis. And the Emperor of Russia cannot fail to remember that the last negociation between Great Britain and France was broken off, upon points immediately affecting, not his Majesty's own interests, but those of his Imperial Ally. But his Majesty neither understands, nor will he admit, the pretension of the Emperor of Russia to dictate the time, or the mode, of his Majesty's pacific negociations with other powers. It will never be endured by his Majesty that any Government shall indemnify itself for the humiliation of subserviency to France, by the adoption of an insulting and peremptory tone towards Great Britain.

His Majesty proclaims anew those principles of Maritime Law, against which the Armed Neutrality, under the auspices of the Empress Catherine, was originally directed; and against which the present hostilities of Russia are denounced. Those principles have been recognized and acted upon in the best periods of the history of Europe: and acted upon by no Power with more strictness and severity than by Russia herself in the reign of the Empress Catherine.

Those principles it is the right and the duty of his Majesty to maintain: and against every confederacy his Majesty is determined, under the blessing of Divine Provi-

dence to maintain them. They have at all times contributed essentially to the support of the maritime power of Great Britain; but they are become incalculably more valuable and important at a period when the maritime power of Great Britain constitutes the sole remaining bulwark against the overwhelming usurpations of France; the only refuge to which other nations may yet resort, in happier times, for assistance and protection.

WHEN the opportunity for peace between Great Britain and Russia shall arrive, his Majesty will embrace it with eagerness. The arrangements of such a negotiation will not be difficult or complicated. His Majesty, as he has nothing to concede, so he has nothing to require: satisfied if Russia shall manifest a disposition to return to her ancient feelings of friendship towards Great Britain; to a just consideration of her her own true interests, and to a sense of her own dignity as an independent nation.

Westminster, Dec. 18, 1807.

No. VIII.

STATEMENT of the Danish Prizes, Stores, &c.

LINE OF BATTLE SHIPS.——They are iron-fastened, and neither constructed, nor calculated to bear the wear and tear of cruizing, which our ships of war are exposed to. Three of them only are fit for any immediate service, and the best of those has been valued at *Eight Pounds* per ton, by the officers of the Dock-yards; and it has been stated, that the others, (provided upwards of one hundred shipwrights are *constantly* employed upon each), may be got ready for temporary service, (by new bolting their knees and beams, and by sheathing their bottoms with wood over the iron fastenings, and by coppering upon that sheathing,) in the following order:

Eight, from six to fourteen weeks.

Five, from five to six months.

N. B. It was shewn in the papers called for by Mr. Jeffrey, of Poole, and Admiral Markham, that forty-seven shipwrights can build the largest-sized seventy-four, in twelve months.

TIMBER.—Chiefly of small dimensions, and a great part of it fit only for river barges and such like craft.—Much of it is rotten and defective, and some lots of it have already been sold for fire-wood, in order to clear the Yards;

and a great deal more of it must be disposed of in the same way, as soon as it has been valued.

SPARS.—Among the Spars, there are some that will be serviceable for top-masts for line of battle ships, but a very great proportion of them is absolutely unfit for any purpose whatever in the equipment of a ship of war, and would not, at this moment, sell for as much as the peace freight of them would be from the Baltic.

HEMP.—About six hundred tons, or fourteen days consumption for our Yards.

CANVASS.—About five thousand bolts; or, three weeks consumption for our Yards.

CORDAGE.—Chiefly very small, and not fit for the essential parts of the rigging of a ship of war; and it has, upon every trial, proved to be very inferior to English cordage of the same size, excepting what has been re-manufactured from old rope, and is called *twice-laid.*

FINIS.

W. M'Dowall, Printer.

ERRATUM.

Page 56, last line but one, *for* and these *read* the rest.

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